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The Endangered Species Act:  
Static Law Meets Dynamic World 
Holly Doremus  
INTRODUCTION 
Looking back to the origins of federal endangered species law, it 
is nothing short of astonishing how differently the discussion was 
framed then compared with now. The law that now stands as the most 
controversial of federal environmental mandates was utterly non-
controversial when it was enacted. The ecological scientists who now 
play such an active role were nowhere to be seen. The issues that 
arouse so much conflict today were virtually ignored. 
This Article looks at the discussion that preceded and 
accompanied the passage of the Endangered Species Act (―ESA‖), 
focusing on why the law, including its implementation as well as its 
text, took the form it did. In particular, I am interested in why the 
ESA came to assume an unrealistically static vision of nature. The 
answer is complex. First, the Act‘s static structure is typical of law in 
general, which has traditionally embodied the human search for 
stability. Second, the Act is, inevitably, a product of the political 
times in which it was drafted and of a rapid and chaotic legislative 
process, which did not encourage thoughtful examination of the 
complex contours of the conservation problem. Third, it followed in 
part from incorrect but widely shared assumptions about the nature of 
the problem and potential solutions. Fourth, scientific understanding 
was itself in transition as the law was being crafted, moving from a 
focus on the tendency of ecological systems to approach equilibrium 
to one on the ongoing dynamics of many systems. 
 
  Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley. Adam Trott provided research 
assistance on Part I. 
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For the first generation of ESA implementation, stability, although 
illusory, was a rough approximation of reality; conservation policy 
could largely ignore change. Unfortunately, we now find ourselves in 
a world where change is occurring at a sufficiently rapid pace that a 
static conservation strategy is doomed to failure. This Article 
examines the need for a dynamic approach, explaining how the 
ESA‘s tacit assumptions of stasis complicate the task of conservation. 
It then looks at the prospects for moving to a more dynamic model of 
conservation policy, and what it would take to get there. It concludes 
that there are real political, psychological, and practical barriers to 
truly dynamic conservation policy, but that there are ways to move 
incrementally in that direction. 
I. IN THE BEGINNING 
The story of the ESA‘s passage has been told a number of times, 
but from this point of increasingly distant hindsight it is worth 
another look. Although the ESA was by no means the first national 
conservation law, it marked a distinct change from past federal 
conservation efforts in a number of important respects. Earlier law 
had protected only fish and wildlife.
1
 Section 4 of the 1973 ESA 
extended protection for the first time to imperiled plants
2
 and to 
taxonomic groups below the subspecies level.
3
 Earlier law had 
encouraged federal agencies to engage in conservation where it was 
consistent with their primary missions.
4
 Through section 7, the new 
ESA imposed a conservation mandate on all federal agencies 
 
 1. See National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-
669, § 1a, 80 Stat. 926 (1966) (providing for conservation of ―selected species of native fish and 
wildlife‖); Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-135, § 1(2), 83 Stat. 
275 (1969) (extending coverage to invertebrates, but not to plants). 
 2. See Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 3(11), 87 Stat. 886 (1973) 
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1532(16)(2000)) (including plants in the definition of 
―species‖). 
 3. The 1969 Endangered Species Conservation Act had allowed protection of subspecies. 
§ 3(a), 83 Stat. at 275. The 1973 ESA defined ―species‖ to include subspecies and ―any other 
group of fish or wildlife of the same species or smaller taxa in common spatial arrangement that 
interbreed when mature.‖ § 2(11), 87 Stat. at 886 (1973). 
 4. See National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act of 1966, § 2(d) (directing 
the Secretary of the Interior to use programs under his jurisdiction to further conservation 
purposes ―to the extent practicable‖ and to ―encourage other Federal agencies‖ to do so). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol32/iss1/7
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requiring that their actions not jeopardize listed species.
5
 Earlier law 
had imposed no restrictions on actions beyond federal lands. Through 
section 9, the ESA forbade the ―take,‖ broadly defined,6 of any 
endangered species by any person anywhere within the United 
States.
7
 
Despite these sweeping changes, enactment of the ESA was a 
surprisingly placid affair. Essentially no skepticism was expressed 
about either the law‘s conservation goals or its regulatory strategies. 
There was no organized interest group opposition. No one voted 
against the Senate bill. Twelve members of the House of 
Representatives initially voted no, but none of them spoke against the 
bill, and only four persisted in their opposition after the bill came 
back from the conference committee.
8
 To the extent there was any 
disagreement among legislators or witnesses at the legislative 
hearings, it was focused entirely on the role of states,
9
 an issue that 
receded to the background as soon as the law was passed. 
Not long after The ESA‘s passage, Steven Yaffee described it as 
―one of the last pieces of environmental bandwagon legislation.‖10 
Legislators appear to have regarded it as an opportunity to deliver 
ringing rhetoric that would please the environmental movement 
without facing any immediate political costs. Discussion centered on 
charismatic species like grizzly bears, bald eagles, and timber 
wolves.
11
 Lawmaker after lawmaker stepped up to describe the 
potential for disastrous results, up to and including threats to survival 
 
 5. § 7, 87 Stat. at 892. This mandate was later softened slightly, so that it now requires 
only that federal agencies ―insure‖ that their actions are ―not likely‖ to cause jeopardy or 
adversely modify critical habitat. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2006). 
 6. Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 3(14) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (2006)). 
 7. Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 9 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (2006)). 
 8. Shannon Petersen, Comment, Congress and Charismatic Megafauna: A Legislative 
History of the Endangered Species Act, 29 ENVTL. L. 463, 475–76 (1999). 
 9. Id. at 474–75. 
 10. STEVEN L. YAFFEE, PROHIBITIVE POLICY: IMPLEMENTING THE FEDERAL 
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 48 (1982). 
 11. Petersen, supra note 8, at 479–80. Petersen suggests that the Nixon administration 
may not even have realized that the law as enacted extended protection to plants. Id. at 480. 
That may not have seemed like an important question at the time, since the taking of listed 
plants, even on federal lands, was not prohibited until 1982. Endangered Species Act 
Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-304, § 9(b), 96 Stat. 1411, 1426 (1982) (codified as 
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(2)(B) (2000)). 
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of the human species, if the extinction tide were not stemmed.
12
 
Apparently, few foresaw the extent to which the ESA would conflict 
with established federal agency missions and private economic 
interests. 
Although the statute‘s words seem clear, it is widely believed that 
most legislators were not aware of the full scope of the ESA‘s 
coverage when they voted for it. Early drafts of section 7 left 
considerable wiggle room in federal obligations, mandating only that 
agencies take ―practicable‖ steps to conserve listed species, much like 
the 1966 Act. But a handful of White House and congressional 
staffers reworked the bill, introducing a firm prohibition on federal 
actions that would jeopardize listed species or adversely modify 
critical habitat. According to Curtis Bohlen, Undersecretary of the 
Interior at the time, ―there were probably not more than four of us 
who understood its ramifications.‖13 Comments made during Senate 
consideration of the final bill suggest that Bohlen was right,
14
 
although representatives of the Nixon administration had frankly 
acknowledged in legislative hearings that section 7 would ―prevent 
[agencies] from taking action which would jeopardize the continued 
existence of endangered species.‖15  
 
 12. A number of citations from the legislative history are collected in Holly Doremus, The 
Rhetoric and Reality of Nature Protection: Toward a New Discourse, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
11, 21 n.60 (2000).  
 13. CHARLES C. MANN & MARK L. PLUMMER, NOAH‘S CHOICE: THE FUTURE OF 
ENDANGERED SPECIES 160 (1995) (quoting then-Deputy Secretary of the Interior, E.U. Curtis 
Bohlen). 
 14. See Petersen, supra note 8, at 481 (quoting remarks by Senator Tunney, floor manager 
of the bill, to the effect that federal agencies would decide after consultation whether to proceed 
with a project). The true strength and rigidity of section 7 were not much disguised to those 
who took the time to look. A law student interpreting the new law shortly after its passage 
wrote: ―[I]t seems inevitable that § 7 will bring federal actions to a grinding halt in the near 
future.‖ Rudy R. Lachenmeier, Student Article, The Endangered Species Act of 1973: 
Preservation or Pandemonium?, 5 ENVTL. L. 29, 82–83 (1974). By 1976, with the first case 
interpreting section 7 decided and the Tellico Dam conflict looming, others had also noted ―the 
apparently absolute mandate‖ of section 7. See Kate Hutcherson, Endangered Species: The Law 
and the Land, J. FORESTRY, Jan. 1976, 31, 32 (quoting a Forest Service official as saying that 
section 7 ―has the potential to drastically change management prerogatives on large areas of 
land‖); Richard Mallory, Note, Obligations of Federal Agencies under Section 7 of the 
Endangered Species Act of 1973, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1247, 1253 (1976). 
 15. Hearings on the Endangered Species Act of 1973 before the Subcomm. on 
Environment of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., at 68 (1973) (statement 
of Douglas Wheeler, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Fish, Wildlife and Parks); 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol32/iss1/7
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With respect to the take prohibition of section 9, again the 
language of the statute seems clear. No one may ―take‖ an 
endangered wildlife species without a permit.
16
 The statute defines 
―take‖ to include to ―harm‖ or ―harass‖ as well as to kill or capture.17 
The word ―harm‖ was added in a Senate floor amendment, but the 
Senate Report on the bill provided that ―[Take] is defined . . . in the 
broadest possible manner to include every conceivable way in which 
a person can ‗take‘ or attempt to ‗take‘ any fish or wildlife.‖18 That 
the law might limit habitat destruction also seems implicit in its 
findings, which include that ―economic growth and development 
untempered by adequate concern‖19 have been responsible for past 
extinctions, and its first-mentioned purpose of conserving ―the 
ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species 
depend.‖20 
Still, Shannon Petersen may be right that ―no one in Congress 
contemplated that the prohibition against taking a listed species might 
lead to the regulation of land use activities on private property.‖21 
There certainly were statements in the legislative history about the 
importance of habitat destruction as a threat to species, but such 
statements were coupled with references to the ability of the federal 
government to purchase habitat rather than to the regulatory power of 
section 9.
22
 Much greater emphasis was put on the need to control 
overhunting.
23
 To the extent that people noticed the apparent strength 
of the ESA, they may simply have assumed that it was not intended 
to and would not result in exercise of such broad regulatory powers. 
 
Hearings on Endangered Species before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation 
and the Environment of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 93d Cong., 1st 
Sess., at 188 (1973). 
 16. Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 9, 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (2006). 
 17. Id. § 1532(19). 
 18. S. REP. NO. 93-307, at 7 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2989, 2995. The 
House Report used similar language, asserting that ―the broadest possible terms‖ were used to 
describe takings. H.R. REP. NO. 93-412, at 15 (1973). 
 19. Id. § 1531(a)(1). 
 20. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2006). 
 21. Petersen, supra note 8, at 481–82. 
 22. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 706 n.19 
(1995); id. at 728–29 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Lachenmeir, supra note 14, at 39–41; Petersen, 
supra note 8, at 482. 
 23. Petersen, supra note 8, at 482. 
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Environmental citizen suits were new in 1973, and their strength was 
largely untested. The fact that the ESA included a citizen suit 
provision,
24
 therefore, would not necessarily have put people on 
notice that the implementing agencies could be pushed to go beyond 
politically easy steps in implementing the law. 
Shortly after the ESA was signed, a law student noted its 
―alarming‖25 potential to require strong habitat protection: 
[I]t is conceivable that the government could argue that 
destruction of habitat for whatever reason, including logging, 
could be harassment and harmful to endangered species. As 
applied to private land, such an interpretation would appear to 
be on the fringe area of possible interpretations because of both 
the wording of the Act itself and the world-stopping effects.
26
 
 That the Act‘s passage went almost unnoticed by the national 
press suggests that no such ―world-stopping effects‖ were 
anticipated. The Washington Post editorialized in favor of the new 
law while it was under consideration.
27
 The New York Times had 
campaigned for the first federal endangered species law in 1966.
28
 
But the Post, Times, and other major papers barely acknowledged the 
milestone when the 1973 ESA was finally signed into law.
29
 
The scientific community appears to have been similarly 
unimpressed. Today, it is difficult to find an issue of Science, 
BioScience, Conservation Biology, or any major ecology journal that 
does not mention conservation law and policy. Today, any important 
legislative or regulatory development is extensively covered in the 
scientific press. But in 1973 almost nothing was said about the 
 
 24. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2006). 
 25. Lachenmeier, supra note 14, at 39. 
 26. Id. See also Mallory, supra note 14, at 1252 (suggesting that ―the most significant 
reference to habitat may be in section 7, since that section imposes controls on all federal 
actions with an impact on habitat‖). With remarkable prescience, Lachenmeier went on to 
suggest a hypothetical: ―[c]onsider here that if the spotted owl was determined to be endangered 
and that if it needs 200 to 300 acres of old-growth Douglas fir per mating pair, how many acres 
of timber could be tied up . . . .‖ Lachenmeier, supra note 14, at 39. Others insisted that 
―because of property rights, it is not possible to legally protect critical habitat on private lands.‖ 
Hutcherson, supra note 14, at 33. 
 27. Editorial, Protecting Endangered Species, WASH. POST, June 26, 1973, at A22. 
 28. Editorial, Man, the Endangered Species, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1966, at 36. 
 29. Petersen, supra note 8, at 483. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol32/iss1/7
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impending passage of the ESA. That was not simply because 
scientists of the era were apolitical or did not recognize the 
importance of law for conservation. Science covered the rise of 
environmental law and the increasingly active practice of 
environmental litigation in the late 1960s, noting the role of scientists 
in that litigation.
30
 BioScience had noted the anthropogenic extinction 
crisis as early as 1970, and praised biologists who were becoming 
more active in addressing the problem.
31
 In 1973 the scientific 
publications covered the negotiations that produced the Convention 
on International Trade in Endangered Species
32
 and later criticized 
the slow pace of ratification and U.S. implementation of that treaty.
33
 
But they said nothing about the domestic ESA until the Tellico case 
bubbled up.
34
 It seems that conservation scientists, like the general-
interest press and most legislators, did not consider the ESA 
groundbreaking, or even particularly important.
35
 
It sounds strange to say it, given the heat of the conflicts that 
developed within the first few years of the ESA‘s legislative life and 
have persisted ever since, but the birth of the law may have been too 
easy. If legislators had thought more carefully about what they were 
doing, they might not have passed a law with the same strength and 
scope. In that sense, the lack of controversy worked to the benefit of 
conservation interests. But it also left some key issues, including the 
 
 30. Luther J. Carter, Conservation Law I: Seeking a Breakthrough in the Courts, 166 SCI. 
1487 (1969); Luther J. Carter, Conservation Law II: Scientists Play a Key Role in Court Suits, 
166 SCI. 1601 (1969). 
 31. Lee M. Talbot, Endangered Species, 20 BIOSCIENCE 331 (1970). A responsive letter 
pointed out some shortcomings of the Department of the Interior‘s interpretation of the 1969 
Endangered Species Conservation Act. Kenneth Crowell, Letter in response to Lee Talbot, 
Endangered Species, 20 BIOSCIENCE 790 (1970).  
 32. International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Convention 
Done, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, T.I.A.S. No. 8249. For scholarly coverage of the treaty, 
see, e.g., Robert Gillette, Endangered Species: Moving toward a Cease-Fire, 179 SCI. 1107 
(1973). 
 33. See Constance Holden, Slow Going on the Endangered Species Front, 189 SCI. 623 
(1975). 
 34. See generally Constance Holden, Endangered Species: Review of Law Triggered by 
Tellico Impasse, 196 SCI. 1426 (1977). 
 35. See Holden, supra note 34, at 1426. Passage of the Marine Mammal Protection Act in 
1972 was also lightly covered in the scientific press, garnering only a brief story in BioScience. 
See Anita M. Kongelbeck, The Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 22 BIOSCIENCE 548 
(1972). 
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law‘s goals, strategies for its implementation, and its effects on 
private economic activities, undiscussed.  
A wave of amendments followed the Tellico Dam controversy in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s,
36
 but the key features of the law have 
proved surprisingly politically resilient. Since 1988, when minor 
changes were made,
37
 legislative gridlock and risk aversion on all 
political sides have prevented amendment of the ESA. In important 
respects, the Act continues to rest on a series of assumptions that 
have never been rigorously examined or tested. Some of those 
assumptions turn out to be both wrong and ill-suited to the 
conservation tasks of the twenty-first century. 
II. A STATIC VISION OF NATURE AND OF LAW 
In at least three respects, the ESA as implemented relies on an 
unrealistically static vision of nature and on a commitment to static 
law. First, although the legislative history reveals a familiarity with 
evolution and a desire to protect it, the law nevertheless has come to 
embody the essentialist notion that natural types are distinct and 
unchanging. Second, the regulatory provisions of the ESA assume a 
vision of nature that is both static and simplistic, in which affirmative 
management is not required and the best thing people can do for other 
species is to leave them alone. Third, driven by political pressures 
and an entirely conventional view of the nature of commitments, the 
agencies that implement the ESA have promised that conservation 
commitments, once made, will not later be increased.  
Although I discuss these three fallacies sequentially for analytical 
purposes, they are inextricably linked in both origins and impacts. Of 
course, all of this discussion is exaggerated to make a point; the ESA, 
like the concepts that underlie it, is not and never has been entirely 
static. But, like ecologists and lawyers, it has frequently 
overemphasized the static and underplayed the dynamic. This is 
becoming a more obvious flaw—and a more troublesome one—as we 
 
 36. Act of Nov. 10, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-632, 92 Stat. 3751 (1978); Act of Dec. 28, 1979, 
Pub. L. No. 96-159, 93 Stat. 1225 (1979); Act of Oct. 13, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-304, 96 Stat. 
1411 (1982). 
 37. See Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-478, 102 Stat. 
2306 (1988). 
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come to understand that nature is dynamic on human time scales, and 
as human actions increase the pace of change in the natural world. 
A. Conservation Goals and the Essentialist Fallacy 
The ESA sets out as its purposes the conservation of species and 
the ecosystems upon which they depend,
38
 based on findings that 
species that are of value to the nation and its people in a variety of 
ways have become or are in danger of becoming extinct.
39
 That 
seems straightforward enough, but its implementation necessarily 
requires agreement on what ―species‖ are and how they should be 
identified. 
Agreement on those questions is surprisingly hard to reach. There 
is no unambiguous, widely accepted, and uniformly applicable 
definition of a species. That is not because scientists have not tried to 
develop one: the identification of natural kinds has been a human 
preoccupation for centuries.
40
 The problem is that species are not 
discrete in the way that chemical elements are; the boundaries 
between or around species are not fixed, and there is no objective 
way to decide precisely where those boundaries should be drawn.
41
 
Line-drawing, because it cannot be objective, must be tailored to 
some purpose or derived from some principles if it is to be non-
arbitrary. However, neither Congress nor the agencies that implement 
the ESA have articulated principles for resolving the conservation 
taxonomy problem. 
One reason for that oversight is that the conservation taxonomy 
problem was not recognized when the ESA was being drafted; it only 
became apparent later, when the agencies implementing the ESA 
actually confronted controversy and had to navigate difficult choices. 
 
 38. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2006). There is a third purpose: to take appropriate steps to 
achieve the purposes of a list of international conservation agreements. Id. 
 39. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a) (2006). 
 40. Ernst Mayr has called taxonomy, the science of classifying organisms, biology‘s 
oldest branch. ERNST MAYR, THE GROWTH OF BIOLOGICAL THOUGHT: DIVERSITY, 
EVOLUTION, AND INHERITANCE 243 (1982).  
 41. Charles Darwin recognized the unavoidable arbitrariness of species divisions as soon 
as he recognized that species are not unchanging entities. See MAYR, supra note 40, at 269; 
Jody Hey et al., Understanding and Confronting Species Uncertainty in Biology and 
Conservation, 18 TRENDS ECOLOGY & EVOLUTION 597, 597 (2003).  
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People tend to think they know the difference between species, based 
on differences in appearance and reproductive boundaries, even if 
they cannot supply a precise definition. Most familiar species, under 
most conditions, appear invariant on time scales relevant to a human 
life. As a result, even people who are quite familiar with evolution 
can easily fall into the essentialist fallacy (the assumption that species 
are—or at least can be treated as if they are—invariant).42 In the 
absence of close scientific engagement in the drafting process, 
legislators might easily have assumed, incorrectly, that species are 
both easily identifiable using objective tools
43
 and unchanging on 
time scales relevant to conservation policy efforts. 
1. The Species Problem in Taxonomy 
Early taxonomic classification systems, the best known of which 
was developed by Linnaeus, were explicitly essentialist. They relied 
on differences in appearance and behavior as markers assumed to 
reveal the boundaries between natural kinds created by God that were 
distinct and unchanging.
44
 The development of evolutionary theory 
undermined the conceptual basis for such systems, and for a time cast 
taxonomy adrift. Eventually, though, evolutionary theory brought its 
own principles to the exercise of classification. At least since 1942, 
when Ernst Mayr published an influential book articulating the 
biological species concept,
45
 the dominant taxonomic principle has 
been the identification of evolutionary relationships. 
Mayr‘s biological species concept (―BSC‖) remains the best-
known and probably the most widely used species definition. The 
BSC identifies as a species any group of organisms that interbreeds 
within the group but not with outsiders.
46
 It focuses on reproductive 
 
 42. The essentialist species concept is discussed in MAYR, supra note 40, at 256–58. 
 43. See Stephen T. Garnett & Les Christidis, Implications of Changing Species 
Definitions for Conservation Purposes, 17 BIRD CONSERVATION INT‘L 187, 188 (2007). 
 44. ERNST MAYR, SYSTEMATICS AND THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 108–09 (1942); Editorial, 
The Legacy of Linnaeus, 446 NATURE 231, 232 (2007); Emma Marris, The Species and the 
Specious, 446 NATURE 250, 251 (2007). 
 45. See MAYR, supra note 44. 
 46. See EDWARD O. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE 38 (1982) (―[A] species is a 
population whose members are able to interbreed freely under natural conditions.‖) (emphasis 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol32/iss1/7
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isolation as the foundation of genetic divergence and, therefore, of 
the development of new species. 
Mayr‘s articulation of the BSC did not end debate among 
biologists about how species ought to be identified, and for good 
reason. At the operational level, the BSC does not fit all situations. It 
cannot be coherently applied to organisms that reproduce primarily 
by asexual means, and it would give misleading results if applied 
stringently to the many species that hybridize readily with others but 
still manage to retain their genetic and morphological distinctiveness 
in nature.
47
 It also can be difficult to operationalize, because it is not 
easy to observe whether interbreeding is or might be occurring.
48
 
Finally, it is now recognized that reproductive isolation is not 
essential to genetic divergence and speciation; adaptive selection can 
effectively substitute for isolation and genetic drift.
49
  
Scientists dissatisfied with the BSC have developed a host of 
competing species concepts. Ten years ago, a review found twenty-
two such concepts in the modern literature,
50
 and the issue remains a 
hot topic for debate.
51
 The differences among all these concepts, 
however, are not fundamental. They reflect considerable 
disagreement about the appropriate criteria for identifying species—
morphology, interbreeding, or genetic divergence (neutral or 
adaptive)—and the degree of separation necessary to recognize a 
boundary. The plurality of definitions persists, and is likely 
irreducible, because no single definition works for every type of 
 
omitted); Stephen J. O‘Brien & Ernst Mayr, Bureaucratic Mischief: Recognizing Endangered 
Species and Subspecies, 251 SCI. 1187, 1187 (1991). 
 47. Holly Doremus, Listing Decisions under the Endangered Species Act: Why Better 
Science Isn’t Always Better Policy, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1029, 1091 (1997). 
 48. Anna L. George & Richard L. Mayden, Species Concepts and the Endangered Species 
Act: How a Valid Biological Definition of Species Enhances the Legal Protection of 
Biodiversity, 45 NAT. RESOURCES J. 369, 391 (2005). 
 49. Patrik Nosil, Ernst Mayr and the Integration of Geographic and Ecological Factors in 
Speciation, 95 BIOLOGICAL J. LINNEAN SOC‘Y 26, 26–27 (2008). 
 50. R. L. Mayden, A Hierarchy of Species Concepts: The Denouement in the Saga of the 
Species Problem, in SPECIES: THE UNITS OF BIODIVERSITY 381, 389 (M. F. Claridge, H. A. 
Dahwah & M. R. Wilson eds., 1997). See also Marris, supra note 44, at 251 (quoting one 
systematist as saying ―We have more definitions [of species] than I can even remember.‖). 
 51. See, e.g., SPECIES CONCEPTS AND PHYLOGENETIC THEORY: A DEBATE (Quentin D. 
Wheeler & Rudolf Meier eds., 2000). 
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organism.
52
 Despite these differences, there is general agreement that 
the species represents a fundamental organizing unit, even if it cannot 
be clearly defined. Conceptually, the species represents a shared 
evolutionary history, ―the contemporaneous tip of an evolutionary 
lineage.‖53 
Notwithstanding this fundamental conceptual agreement, the 
choice of species definitions can make a significant difference in 
practice. For example, the ―phylogenetic species concept‖ (―PSC‖) is 
probably the most widely used after Mayr‘s BSC. The PSC 
recognizes as species ―populations differing by at least one 
taxonomic character from all others,‖54 whether or not reproductively 
isolated. Its use tends to produce more species than reliance on the 
biological species concept, which requires a showing of reproductive 
isolation.
55
 Despite this general tendency toward ―taxonomic 
inflation,‖56 use of the phylogenetic approach also calls into question 
some established taxonomic distinctions.
57
 
Subspecies are an even more contested category. Subspecies do 
not have the fundamental biological significance of species; they are 
 
 52. Mark L. Blaxter, The Promise of a DNA Taxonomy, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS: 
BIOLOGICAL SCIS. 669, 669 (2004). 
 53. Jody Hey, On the Failure of Modern Species Concepts, 21 TRENDS ECOLOGY & 
EVOLUTION 447, 449 (2006). See also Kevin de Queiroz, Ernst Mayr and the Modern Concept 
of Species, 102 PROC. NAT‘L ACAD. SCIENCES 6600, 6603 (2005) (explaining that the species 
represents a ―separately evolving metapopulation lineage‖); Dylan J. Fraser & Louis 
Bernatchez, Adaptive Evolutionary Conservation: Towards a Unified Concept for Defining 
Conservation Units, 10 MOLECULAR ECOLOGY 2741, 2745 (2001) (―[S]pecies concepts are 
fundamentally not very different from each other.‖). 
 54. Nick J.B. Isaac et al., Taxonomic Inflation: Its Influence on Macroecology and 
Conservation, 19 TRENDS ECOLOGY & EVOLUTION 464, 465 (2004). The distinct character can 
be morphological but more often is a difference in a conserved gene sequence. Id. 
 55. Id. One study found that the phylogenetic approach generated an average of forty-
eight percent more species than the biological species concept applied to the same groups of 
organisms. Paul-Michael Agapow et al., The Impact of Species Concept on Biodiversity Studies, 
79 Q. REV. BIOLOGY 161, 164 (2004). 
 56. The term ―taxonomic inflation‖ appears to have been coined by David Patterson. See 
David Patterson, The Diversity of Eukaryotes, 154 AM. NATURALIST S96, S99 (1999). Isaac et 
al. define it as the situation ―in which many existing subspecies are raised to species level.‖ 
Isaac et al., supra note 54, at 464. Or, as one of the co-authors of that study describes it on his 
web page, ―[t]axonomic inflation is the rapid accumulation of scientific names due to processes 
other than new discoveries of taxa.‖ James Mallet, Taxonomic Inflation, http://www.ucl.ac.uk/ 
taxome/jim/Sp/taxinfl.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2010). 
 57. It suggests, for example, that polar bears are in the same species as brown bears. 
Marris, supra note 44, at 250. 
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not the units of evolution. Nor does their identification follow 
logically from one or more species concepts.
58
 Indeed, many 
subspecies are relics of earlier classification systems; subspecies 
proliferated as the spread of the BSC resulted in the ―demotion‖ of 
named entities that did not fit Mayr‘s demanding definition.59 Those 
studying different organisms have developed different naming 
cultures.
60
 Birds, for example, tend to be separated into more 
subspecies than fish, even when the pattern of variation is similar.
61
 It 
is frequently observed that subspecies are ―inherently subjective,‖ or 
even arbitrary.
62
 Because of its difficulties, ―the subspecies concept is 
gradually falling out of favour with most current taxonomists,‖63 
although it continues to be used and ―many subspecies are 
evolutionarily definable entities.‖64 
Below the subspecies level, the situation gets even murkier. The 
distinction between a subspecies and a population is unclear, both at 
 
 58. There is no room for subspecies in the phylogenetic species concept. Under Mayr‘s 
BSC, which identifies species on the basis of reproductive isolation, it might be logical to 
recognize as subspecies groups that are partially reproductively isolated, but that is not how 
subspecies have been identified in practice. Susan M. Haig et al., Taxonomic Considerations in 
Listing Subspecies under the U.S. Endangered Species Act, 20 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1584, 
1585 (2006). 
 59. See Robert M. Zink, The Role of Subspecies in Obscuring Avian Biological Diversity 
and Misleading Conservation Policy, 271 PROC: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 561, 561 (2004). 
 60. See Isaac et al., supra note 54, at 464.  
 61. NAT‘L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 55 (1995). 
See also Haig et al., supra note 58, at 1588 (noting that ―under a strict subspecies definition,‖ 
the fish of every isolated creek could be considered a unique subspecies, but that subspecies 
classification has been used ―sparingly‖). For an analysis of speciation differences among taxa, 
see generally ALESSANDRO MINELLI, BIOLOGICAL SYSTEMATICS: THE STATE OF THE ART 
(1993). 
 62. See MAYR, supra note 40, at 251–53; M.A. Cronin, The Preble’s Meadow Jumping 
Mouse: Subjective Subspecies, Advocacy and Management, 10 ANIMAL CONSERVATION 159, 
159 (2007) and citations therein; Matthew A. Cronin, Systematics, Taxonomy, and the 
Endangered Species Act: The Example of the California Gnatcatcher, 25 WILDLIFE SOC‘Y 
BULL. 661, 661–62 (1997); Haig et al., supra note 58, at 1586 (―In an extensive literature 
review, we found no universally accepted subspecies definition within or across taxa.‖); Oliver 
A. Ryder, Species Conservation and Systematics: The Dilemma of Subspecies, 1 TRENDS 
ECOLOGY & EVOLUTION 9, 9 (1986) (―The folklore of mammalogy is replete with humorous 
anecdotes such as two subspecies being named from individuals that were littermates. Yet, 
other taxa that have been considered by some authorities to be conspecific, for example the 
barking deer or muntjacs of India and China, produce sterile hybrids.‖). 
 63. Rainer Froese, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: A Critical Look at Species and Their 
Institutions from a User’s Perspective, 9 REVS. FISH BIOLOGY & FISHERIES 375, 376 (1999). 
 64. Haig et al., supra note 58, at 1586. 
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the conceptual and at the pragmatic level,
65
 and the term population 
(like subspecies) has no fixed biological significance. The criticisms 
of subspecies identification apply equally to the identification of 
populations as taxonomic units: as with subspecies, ―there is no 
consensus as to the extent of differentiation required.‖66 
2. Translating Taxonomy to Law  
The difficulties of identifying taxa might concern only 
taxonomists, except that the ESA attaches significant regulatory and 
economic consequences to taxonomic line-drawing. The ESA calls 
for protection of species that are in danger of extinction or likely to 
become so in the foreseeable future.
67
 It includes a definition of 
―species‖ that is broad, but not a model of clarity: 
The term ―species‖ includes any subspecies of fish or wildlife 
or plants, and any distinct population segment of any species 
of vertebrate fish or wildlife which interbreeds when mature.
68
 
 The more narrowly a ―species,‖ within the meaning of the statute, 
is defined, the more likely it is to qualify for listing. Fewer 
individuals and smaller ranges magnify the impact of threats.
69
 
Fights about ESA protection resting on taxonomy are frequent. 
One might think that the significance of divisions at the species level 
would be minimal, because the law allows protection of subspecies 
and distinct population segments. But it turns out that species-level 
taxonomy matters in at least two situations: when dealing with 
hybrids or possible hybrids, and when determining how important a 
threatened local population is to its full taxon. 
Hybridization could push against listing, if it led to the conclusion 
that the group in question is not a ―true‖ species, or that a once-extant 
species has ceased to exist. Or it could push toward listing, if 
outbreeding poses a threat to the ―true‖ species. And without regard 
 
 65. See Froese, supra note 63, at 376. 
 66. Cronin, supra note 62, at 663. 
 67. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1) (2006); § 1532(6) (20). 
 68. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(16) (2006). 
 69. Marris, supra note 44, at 251. 
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to the legal ramifications, hybridization might seem like the only 
hope for any kind of future for the most severely reduced groups. 
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (―FWS‖) and National Marine 
Fisheries Service (―NMFS,‖ also known as NOAA Fisheries) 
(together ―the Services‖), do not currently have a formal policy on 
hybrids. The Interior Solicitor‘s office waffled in the early days of the 
ESA, first concluding that any progeny of a protected entity was itself 
protected, then quickly reversing course to say that the progeny of 
interbreeding between species or even between subspecies were flatly 
ineligible for federal protection.
70
 That stance was withdrawn as too 
―rigid‖ in 1990.71 A new policy was proposed in 1996,72 but it was 
never finalized. FWS now evaluates the legal consequences of 
hybridization on a case-by-case basis.
73
 
So far, the hybrid question has arisen infrequently. In 1981, the 
dusky seaside sparrow, a listed subspecies, was down to five 
individuals, all male.
74
 Biologists deliberately bred those males with 
females from a morphologically similar subspecies, under a plan 
designed to produce birds that would be morphologically 
indistinguishable from the dusky within a few generations.
75
 The 
breeding program was ended, however, when FWS concluded that it 
could not provide funding because the hybrid progeny would not be 
protectable under the ESA.
76
 In 2005, NMFS refused to list a type of 
coral known as the fused-staghorn because, although it was described 
as a species in the taxonomic literature, recent genetic evidence 
suggested that it was a hybrid between two other species.
77
 On the 
 
 70. See Kevin D. Hill, The Endangered Species Act: What Do We Mean by Species?, 20 
B. C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 239, 243–46 (1993); O‘Brien & Mayr, supra note 46, at 1187. 
 71. Reconsidered Finding for an Amended Petition to List the Westslope Cutthroat Trout 
as Threatened throughout Its Range, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,989, 46,992 (Aug. 7, 2003) (citing a 1990 
Memorandum from the Assistant Solicitor for Fish and Wildlife, U.S. Department of the 
Interior, to Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17) 
[hereinafter WCT Finding]. 
 72. Proposed Policy and Proposed Rule on the Treatment of Intercrosses and Intercross 
Progeny (the Issue of ―Hybridization‖), 61 Fed. Reg. 4710 (Feb. 7, 1996) (to be codified at 50 
C.F.R. pt. 424). 
 73. WCT Finding, 68 Fed. Reg. at 46,992. 
 74. Hill, supra note 70, at 258. 
 75. Id. at 258–59. 
 76. Id. at 259–61. 
 77. Proposed Threatened Status for Elkhorn Coral and Staghorn Coral, 70 Fed. Reg. 
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other hand, FWS twice has denied petitions requesting that the red 
wolf be removed from the protected list on the grounds that it is 
―only‖ a hybrid between the gray wolf and the coyote.78 FWS 
determined that the evidence did not support the claim that the red 
wolf originated by hybridization, but also asserted that even if that 
were its origin, the red wolf could and would remain protected 
because it is ―representative of the canids that roamed the Southeast 
historically and . . . morphologically and behaviorally distinct from 
coyotes and gray wolves.‖79 
Most recently, FWS has grappled with the taxonomic status of the 
westslope cutthroat trout (―WCT‖), a species known to have 
hybridized in some locations with non-native fish that were stocked 
to support recreational fishing. FWS initially determined that the 
WCT was neither endangered nor threatened.
80
 In making that 
determination, the agency counted all populations, including those 
known to have substantial introgression from non-native trout 
species, even though it recognized hybridization with those other 
species as a major threat. This method of counting helped FWS 
conclude that the trout was sufficiently abundant and widespread that 
it did not qualify for listing. A federal court struck that decision 
down, finding that FWS had not adequately explained its inclusion of 
populations with substantial introgression.
81
 On its second take, FWS 
decided to include all populations within the recognized range of the 
WCT that showed morphology within the range expected for the 
WCT. FWS justified its choice on the grounds that: 
[N]atural populations conforming morphologically to the 
scientific taxonomic description of WCT are presumed to 
 
24,359, 24,360 (May 9, 2005) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 223). NMFS eventually listed 
both parent species as threatened. Final Listing Determinations for Elkhorn Coral and Staghorn 
Coral, 71 Fed. Reg. 26,852 (May 9, 2006) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 223). 
 78. 90-Day Finding for a Petition to Delist the Red Wolf, 62 Fed. Reg. 64,799 (Dec. 9, 
1997) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17); Finding on a Petition to Delist the Red Wolf, 57 Fed. 
Reg. 1246 (Jan. 13, 1992). 
 79. Finding on a Petition to Delist the Red Wolf (Canis rufus), 57 Fed. Reg. 1246, 1250 
(Jan. 13, 1992) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). 
 80. 12-Month Finding for an Amended Petition to List the Westslope Cutthroat Trout as 
Threatened throughout Its Range, 65 Fed. Reg. 20,120 (Apr. 14, 2000) (to be codified at 50 
C.F.R. pt. 17). 
 81. Am. Wildlands v. Norton, 193 F. Supp. 2d 244, 257 (D.D.C. 2002). 
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express the behavioral, ecological, and life-history 
characteristics of WCT native to the geographic areas where 
those populations occur.
82
 
 In other words, the agency interpreted the ESA as protecting the 
expected look, behavior, and ecological role of the native species, 
whether or not the fish expressing those characteristics had some 
level of ―outside‖ genes. That approach was upheld by the D.C. 
Circuit.
83
 
The scope of a species can determine whether a population 
warrants listing or not. The ESA itself says little about which 
populations can be listed—it simply defines a ―distinct population 
segment‖ (―DPS‖) eligible for listing as one that ―interbreeds when 
mature.‖84 But a congressional report warned implementing agencies 
that they should list populations cautiously;
85
 not surprisingly, they 
have taken the hint. In 1996, the Services issued a joint policy saying 
that a group would qualify as a listable distinct population segment 
only if it were shown to be both ―substantially reproductively 
isolated‖ and ―an important component in the evolutionary legacy of 
the species.‖86 That second element means that whether a group 
constitutes a listable population depends critically on the definition of 
the species to which it belongs. 
Defining ―species‖ became a point of contention when NMFS had 
to decide whether to list killer whales in the Puget Sound area. The 
taxonomic community formally recognizes only one global species of 
killer whale. Although NMFS scientists believed that taxonomy was 
outdated and did not accurately reflect the biology of the killer whale, 
the agency used the global species as the comparison taxon. It found 
 
 82. Reconsidered Finding for an Amended Petition to List the Westslope Cutthroat Trout 
as Threatened throughout Its Range, 68 Fed. Reg., 46,989, 46,995 (Aug. 7, 2003) (to be 
codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). The agency still found that the WCT did not warrant listing, 
because WCT populations retaining ―substantial portions of their genetic ancestry‖ were widely 
distributed in secure habitats. Id. at 47,006. 
 83. Am. Wildlands, 530 F.3d, at 998–1000. 
 84. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(16) (2006). 
 85. S. REP. NO. 96-151, at 7 (1979), as reprinted in CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 
A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT OF 1973, AS AMENDED IN 1976, 
1977, 1978, 1979, AND 1980, at 1397 (1982). 
 86. Policy Regarding the Recognition of Distinct Vertebrate Population Segments under 
the Endangered Species Act, 61 Fed. Reg. 4722, 4722 (Feb. 7, 1996). 
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that the Puget Sound whales were not significant to the global taxon. 
Accordingly, it declined to list them. A reviewing court ruled that the 
agency had improperly relied on a global taxon its own scientists 
universally believed was incorrect, violating the ESA‘s requirement 
that listing decisions rest on the best available scientific 
information.
87
 On remand, NMFS found that the Puget Sound killer 
whales ―likely belong to an unnamed subspecies of resident killer 
whales in the North Pacific,‖ are significant with respect to that 
population, and warrant listing as a DPS.
88
 
Subspecies and populations make up a significant portion of the 
ESA protected list,
89
 and many listings of subspecies and populations 
have been highly controversial. The narrower the lines drawn around 
a group identified as a ―species‖ for purposes of the Act, the more 
likely it is to be listed, with attendant economic consequences. Given 
the stakes and the lack of clear rules for line-drawing, it is not 
surprising that the Services have struggled to determine a consistent 
approach, or that they have faced frequent challenges in individual 
cases. I detailed the Services‘ incoherent approach to the ESA 
taxonomy problem thirteen years ago.
90
 Not much has changed since 
then. Litigation over the protection of subspecies and distinct 
population segments is still common. It remains unclear what 
principles the Services use to identify subspecies, other than an 
established consensus in the taxonomic world. Where such consensus 
is absent or susceptible to new information, the Services are cast 
adrift. The relevant principles have been more clearly articulated for 
the identification of distinct population segments, but those principles 
are contested and difficult to apply. 
A few recent examples illustrate the challenges of the taxonomic 
tasks facing the Services, and how they have responded. At the 
subspecies level, the stories of the Preble‘s jumping mouse and the 
western sage grouse are illustrative. At the level of distinct 
population segments, Pacific salmon are the best example. 
 
 87. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Lohn, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1243 (W.D. Wash. 2003). 
 88. Endangered Status for Southern Resident Killer Whales, 70 Fed. Reg. 69,903, 69,904 
(Nov. 18, 2005) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 224). 
 89. As of 2006, roughly one-fourth of the entities listed under the ESA were subspecies or 
populations. Haig et al., supra note 58, at 1585. 
 90. Doremus, supra note 47, at 1103–12. 
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The greater sage grouse is a chicken-like, ground-nesting bird 
found in the western United States and Canada,
91
 ―renowned for its 
spectacular breeding displays.‖92 The western sage grouse was first 
described as a subspecies of the greater sage grouse in 1946.
93
 The 
American Ornithologists Union (―AOU‖), the taxonomic authority 
for birds in North America, recognized two subspecies, the eastern 
and western, of greater sage grouse in 1957.
94
 The most recent edition 
of the AOU‘s authoritative Birds of North America, published in 
2000, continues to list both subspecies but describes them as ―weakly 
differentiated‖ and difficult to diagnose.95 
From 1980 through 2001, FWS accepted the AOU taxonomy, 
treating the western sage grouse as a subspecies without additional 
analysis,
96
 despite noting in 2001 that ―there is no apparent genetic 
distinction between the recognized eastern and western subspecies.‖97 
In 2003, however, faced with a petition to list the entire western 
subspecies, FWS changed its taxonomic tune. It rejected the petition 
on the grounds that there was ―insufficient evidence to indicate that 
the western population of sage grouse is a valid subspecies or a 
Distinct Population Segment.‖98 While conceding that the AOU 
continued to recognize the subspecies FWS pointed out that the AOU 
had ―not formally or officially reviewed‖ subspecies.99 The agency 
noted that sage grouse experts disagree about the validity of the 
subspecies. Based on the lack of evidence of distinct genetic 
differences or ecological or physical isolation, FWS concluded that 
 
 91. 12-Month Finding for a Petition to List the Washington Population of Western Sage 
Grouse (Centrocercus urophasianus phaios), 66 Fed. Reg. 22,984, 22,985 (May 7, 2001) (to be 
codified at 50 C.F.R. pt 17) [hereinafter 2001 Sage Grouse Petition Finding]. 
 92. M.A. Schroeder, J.R. Young & C.E. Braun, Greater Sage-Grouse (Centrocercus 
urophasianus), in BIRDS OF NORTH AMERICA ONLINE (A. Poole ed., 1999), http://bna.birds. 
cornell.edu/bna/species/425. 
 93. John W. Aldrich, New Subspecies of Birds from Western North America, 59 PROC. 
BIOLOGICAL SOC‘Y WASHINGTON 129 (1946). 
 94. See 2001 Sage Grouse Petition Finding, 66 Fed. Reg. at 22,985. 
 95. Schroeder et al., supra note 92. 
 96. See Review of Vertebrate Wildlife, 50 Fed. Reg. 37,958, 37,959 (Sept. 18, 1985) (to 
be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17); 2001 Sage Grouse Petition Finding, 66 Fed. Reg. at 22,985. 
 97. 2001 Sage Grouse Petition Finding, 66 Fed. Reg. at 22,991. 
 98. 90-Day Finding on a Petition to List the Western Sage Grouse, 68 Fed. Reg. 6500, 
6500 (Feb. 7, 2003). 
 99. Id. 
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the western sage grouse ―is not a valid subspecies.‖100 That 
conclusion, however, did not survive judicial review. The Ninth 
Circuit ruled that FWS had not sufficiently explained its change of 
heart from 2001 to 2003, particularly considering that the only sage 
grouse taxonomist consulted said that the validity of the official 
taxonomy could not be tested with the data available and raised 
questions about the conclusion by FWS biologists.
101
 FWS 
subsequently began a status review, considering among other things 
the taxonomic validity of the western subspecies.
102
 In March 2010 it 
concluded again that the western sage grouse is not a valid taxonomic 
entity, based on the lack of clear and consistent geographic, 
morphological, or genetic distinctions.
103
 
The Preble‘s meadow jumping mouse (Zapus hudsonius preblei) 
is a three-inch rodent with a long tail and big feet, capable of three-
foot leaps, that lives in riparian areas in the Rocky Mountains.
104
 The 
Preble‘s mouse was identified as one of twelve subspecies of the 
meadow jumping mouse in 1954 based on morphology (coloring and 
skull shape) and geographic isolation from other meadow jumping 
mouse populations.
105
 The taxonomic status of the Preble‘s mouse 
was an obscure topic until its listing as a threatened species in 1998
106
 
complicated development in some of the fastest-growing 
communities in the region. At that point, the Preble‘s mouse became 
a cause célèbre. When Dr. Rob Roy Ramey, a scientist at the Denver 
Museum of Nature and Science, proposed a study of whether the 
 
 100. Id. at 6503. FWS went on to conclude that the lack of clear isolation meant that the 
western sage grouse also did not qualify as a distinct population segment. Id. 
 101. Inst. for Wildlife Prot. v. Norton, 174 Fed. App‘x 363, 366–67 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 102. 90-Day Finding on a Petition to List the Western Sage-Grouse (Centrocercus 
urophasianus phaios) as Threatened or Endangered, 73 Fed. Reg. 23,170, 23, 170 (Apr. 29, 
2008) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). Although the twelve months allowed for that review 
have passed, no finding has yet been announced. 
 103. 12-Month Findings for Petitions to List the Greater Sage-Grouse (Centrocercus 
urophasianus) as Threatened or Endangered, 75 Fed. Reg. 13,910, 13,912–15 (Mar. 23, 2010). 
 104. Christie Aschwanden, Is It or Isn’t It (Just Another Mouse)?, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, 
Aug. 7, 2006, at 12. 
 105. See Philip H. Krutzsch, North American Jumping Mice (Genus Zapus), 7 UNIV. KAN. 
PUBLICATIONS, MUSEUM NAT. HIST. 351 (1954), available at http://www.biodiversitylibrary. 
org. 
 106. Final Rule to List the Preble‘s Meadow Jumping Mouse as a Threatened Species, 63 
Fed. Reg. 26,517 (May 13, 1998) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). 
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Preble‘s mouse deserved subspecies status, the State of Wyoming 
was happy to provide funding. It was even happier when Ramey‘s 
study concluded that the Preble‘s mouse did not warrant 
classification as a unique subspecies.
107
 Ramey‘s study provoked a 
sharp exchange in the normally staid journal literature, featuring 
charges on both sides of advocacy trumping science.
108
 
Relying heavily on Ramey‘s work, Wyoming petitioned FWS to 
remove the Preble‘s meadow jumping mouse from the protected list. 
In response to that petition, FWS proposed delisting
109
 but also 
sought additional scientific input. After receiving conflicting opinions 
from fourteen scientists, FWS commissioned a new genetic study by 
US Geological Survey scientist Tim King. Using slightly different 
methods, King affirmed the earlier taxonomy, concluding that the 
Preble‘s mouse was genetically distinct from other subspecies.110 
Wyoming sought a third opinion from a biologist at Brigham Young 
University, who concluded that there were ―differences between the 
Preble‘s and Bear Lodge mice, but not enough to justify their 
description as two subspecies.‖111 New studies appeared, King and 
Ramey traded ugly comments,
112
 and FWS eventually empanelled an 
 
 107. Rob Roy Ramey, II et al., Genetic Relatedness of the Preble’s Meadow Jumping 
Mouse (Zapus Hudsonius Preblei) to nearby Subspecies of Z. Hudsonius as Inferred from 
Variation in Cranial Morphology, Mitochondrial DNA and Microsatellite DNA: Implications 
for Taxonomy and Conservation, 8 ANIMAL CONSERVATION 329, 334 (2005). 
 108. See S.N. Vignieri et al., Mistaken View of Taxonomic Validity Undermines 
Conservation of an Evolutionarily Distinct Mouse: A Response to Ramey et al. (2005), 9 
ANIMAL CONSERVATION 237 (2006); R.R. Ramey, II et al., Response to Vignieri et al. (2006): 
Should Hypothesis Testing or Selective Post Hoc Interpretation of Results Guide the Allocation 
of Conservation Effort, 9 ANIMAL CONSERVATION 244 (2006); A. Martin, Letter to the Editor, 
Advocacy Dressed up as Science: Response to Ramey et al. (2005), 9 ANIMAL CONSERVATION 
248 (2006); K.A. Crandall, Letter to the Editor, Advocacy Dressed up as Scientific Critique, 9 
ANIMAL CONSERVATION 250 (2006); M.A. Cronin, Correspondence, The Preble’s Meadow 
Jumping Mouse: Subjective Subspecies, Advocacy and Management, 10 ANIMAL 
CONSERVATION 159 (2007). 
 109. 12-Month Finding on a Petition to Delist the Preble‘s Meadow Jumping Mouse 
(Zapus hudsonius preblei) and Proposed Delisting of the Preble‘s Meadow Jumping Mouse, 70 
Fed. Reg. 5404 (Feb. 2, 2005) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). 
 110. Tim L. King et al., Comprehensive Genetic Analyses Reveal Evolutionary Distinction 
of a Mouse (Zapus Hudsonius Preblei) Proposed for Delisting from the U.S. Endangered 
Species Act, 15 MOLECULAR ECOLOGY 4331, 4345–47 (2006). 
 111. Peter Aldhous, The Mouse That No One Can Ignore, NEW SCIENTIST, July 15, 2006, 
at 12. 
 112. King accused Ramey of making a systematic error. Ramey responded that, ―Tim 
King‘s station in life seems to be to do scientific colonoscopies.‖ Jim Erickson, Biologists Pelt 
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expert advisory body to sort it all out. The panel determined that the 
Preble‘s mouse was a valid subspecies under most definitions, 
although it conceded that a crucial test, revisiting the morphological 
measurements used to establish the subspecies in 1954, had not been 
undertaken.
113
 
The panel‘s report offered two major explanations for the 
disagreement between King and Ramey, one scientific and the other 
not. First, the panel concluded that Ramey had poorly designed, 
carried out, and interpreted some of the genetic studies that 
purportedly demonstrated shared DNA sequences between the 
Preble‘s and other meadow jumping mice.114 Second, the panel noted 
that King and Ramey disagreed about the level of difference needed 
to justify separating groups into different subspecies, the amount of 
evidence needed to justify overturning a long-established taxonomic 
distinction, and the significance of lack of evidence.
115
  
Although it is a cliché in science that ―absence of evidence is not 
evidence of absence,‖116 it remains commonplace for investigators to 
conclude that the failure to demonstrate a difference between two 
data sets is tantamount to demonstrating their equivalence.
117
 It is 
surely human nature to assume that failure to disprove assertion X 
amounts to at least some evidence that assertion X is true, but in fact 
there may be no way to estimate the likelihood that two populations 
are equivalent from a result that does not show significant 
differences.
118
 That creates a quandary when management decisions 
 
One Another over Mouse, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, June 21, 2006, at 12A. 
 113. Letter from Steven P. Courtney, Vice President, Sustainable Ecosystems Inst., to Seth 
Willey, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (July 20, 2006); SUSTAINABLE ECOSYSTEMS INST., 
EVALUATION OF SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION REGARDING PREBLE‘S MEADOW JUMPING MOUSE 
(2006), http://www.fws.gov/mountainprairie/species/mammals/preble/Prebles_SEI_report.pdf. 
 114. SUSTAINABLE ECOSYSTEMS INST., supra note 113, at 3. 
 115. Id. at 4. 
 116. See, e.g., Douglas G. Altman & J. Martin Bland, Absence of Evidence Is Not Evidence 
of Absence, 311 BRIT. MED. J. 485 (1995). 
 117. See, e.g., Fiona Fidler et al., Impact of Criticism of Null-Hypothesis Significance 
Testing on Statistical Reporting Practices in Conservation Biology, 20 CONSERVATION 
BIOLOGY 1539, 1542 (2006) (concluding that Null-Hypothesis Significance Testing is still 
prevalent in articles published in leading conservation biology journals). 
 118. Berry J. Brosi & Eric G. Biber, Statistical Inference, Type II Error, and Decision 
Making under the U.S. Endangered Species Act, 7 FRONTIERS ECOLOGY & THE ENV‘T, 
available at http://www.esajournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1890/080003.  
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must be made (as they frequently must) based on sharply limited 
information. Investigators may feel the need to reach a conclusion, 
despite acute awareness of the limits of their data, and decision-
makers may have no choice but to do so. Inevitably one assumption 
or another is privileged in the evaluation and wins in the face of 
inconclusive evidence. In the Preble‘s dispute, Ramey privileged the 
assumption that subspecies should not be recognized in the absence 
of strong evidence of differentiation.
119
 King, on the other hand, 
privileged the assumption that established taxonomy should continue 
to be regarded as valid absent statistically significant evidence that it 
was erroneous. The review panel agreed with King‘s assumption,120 
and therefore with his conclusion that the traditional recognition of 
the Preble‘s as a subspecies was justified.121 
At the smallest taxonomic scale, the ESA allows listing of 
―distinct population segments‖ (―DPSs‖) of vertebrate animals.122 
Congress has not further defined that term, nor is it a taxonomic term 
of art. The Services, however, have been more forthcoming about 
their understanding of DPSs than about how they identify species or 
subspecies. DPS delineation first became an issue in Pacific salmon, 
in part because fish systematists have not traditionally recognized 
subspecies to the extent as have other taxonomists. In 1990, faced 
with petitions to list several Pacific salmon stocks, NMFS 
encountered the difficult task of identifying protectable entities 
within species characterized by a combination of large ranges with 
substantial local variation and reproductive isolation. In 1991, NMFS 
issued a policy declaring that it would consider for listing only 
―evolutionary significant units‖ (―ESUs‖) of salmon species.123 ESUs 
 
 119. The Sustainable Ecosystems Institute panel noted that Ramey‘s criteria for 
recognizing a subspecies were more conservative than the norm for the taxonomic community. 
See SUSTAINABLE ECOSYSTEMS INST., supra note 113, at 10, 34, 38–39. 
 120. ―Because Z. h. preblei is a formally described, valid, and commonly recognized taxon, 
we concluded that the burden of proof should lie in clearly showing that its taxonomic status is 
not warranted.‖ Id. at 39. 
 121. Ramey agrees that his key differences with King and other detractors are ―conceptual 
and philosophical‖ but continues to defend the high threshold he would require for the 
recognition of a subspecies. Marris, supra note 44, at 252–53. 
 122. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(16) (2006). 
 123. Policy on Applying the Definition of Species under the Endangered Species Act to 
Pacific Salmon, 56 Fed. Reg. 58,612 (Nov. 20, 1991). 
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must satisfy two criteria: they must be ―substantially reproductively 
isolated‖ and ―represent an important component in the evolutionary 
legacy of the species.‖124 
A few years later, the Services jointly published a more general 
policy for recognizing DPSs. Described as ―consistent with‖ the 
earlier ESU policy, the new DPS policy requires that a group be both 
―discrete‖ and ―significant‖ to the larger taxon in order to qualify as a 
DPS.
125
 Although there are some differences between the two,
126
 they 
play out similarly in practice. The Services consider morphology but 
tend to emphasize genetic distinctness as the basis for a finding of 
reproductive isolation (under the ESU Policy) or discreteness (under 
the more general DPS Policy), probably because that emphasizes 
their expertise and disguises the inevitable role of value judgments.
127
 
Genetic distinctness also factors into the evolutionary legacy (ESU) 
and significance (DPS) criteria.
128
 
The ESU policy aims to identify and protect populations that 
matter most in an evolutionary sense. That is precisely the role that 
modern species and subspecies classification schemes are supposed 
to play, but it is widely recognized that they do not do so effectively 
for many taxa of conservation interest. Indeed, the term ESU itself 
originated in the frustration of zoo biologists ―with the limitations of 
current mammalian taxonomy in determining which named 
subspecies actually represent significant adaptive variation,‖ and their 
search for a better category than the subspecies.
129
 NMFS was 
engaged in a similar search when it developed the ESU policy, which 
seeks to identify and protect ―the genetic variability that is a product 
of past evolutionary events and that represents the reservoir upon 
 
 124. Id. 
 125. Policy Regarding the Recognition of Distinct Population Segments under the 
Endangered Species Act, 61 Fed. Reg. 4722 (Feb. 7, 1996). 
 126. For example, the joint DPS Policy recognizes international boundaries as a basis for 
distinguishing between populations, while the ESU Policy does not. See id. at 4725; Policy on 
Applying the Definition of Species under the Endangered Species Act to Pacific Salmon, 56 
Fed. Reg. at 58,613. 
 127. Doremus, supra note 47, at 1106–07. 
 128. See Policy on Applying the Definition of Species under the Endangered Species Act 
to Pacific Salmon, 56 Fed. Reg. at 58,618; Policy Regarding the Recognition of District 
Vertebrate Population Segments under the Endangered Species Act, 61 Fed. Reg. at 4725. 
 129. Ryder, supra note 62, at 9. 
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which future evolutionary potential depends,‖ with the ultimate goal 
of ensuring that ―the dynamic process of evolution will not be unduly 
constrained in the future.‖130 
Because the DPS policy is ―a detailed extension‖ of the more 
general DPS policy,
131
 the two must share the same general purpose. 
But the DPS policy presents its purpose in a more static manner, as 
serving the ESA‘s twin goals of ―conserving genetic resources and 
maintaining natural systems and biodiversity over a representative 
portion of their historic occurrence.‖132 
3. Looking Forward, Looking Back, Standing Still 
Systematists now basically agree on the core of the species 
concept, which is the identification of a common evolutionary line 
distinct from other evolutionary lines.
133
 Below the species category, 
it is less clear what classifications should be recognized. Subspecies 
and ESUs or DPSs seem to serve three distinct functions in the 
taxonomic scheme. First, they fill gaps in formal taxonomies 
established when the understanding of evolutionary relationships was 
hazy. Taxonomy is an exceedingly conservative science; as the orca 
and sage-grouse stories show, formal classifications do not always 
keep up with new information. Recognition of subspecies and ESUs 
can be more nimble. Second, those lower classifications can smooth 
out some of the differences between species concepts. The BSC 
remains the dominant concept, but as explained earlier it does not 
work for all species, and it does not account well for all forms of 
speciation.
134
 Adding subspecies and ESU designations can 
effectively make the BSC more like its main rival, the PSC, which 
focuses on detectable differences without demanding reproductive 
isolation. Finally, subspecies and ESUs can be used to identify 
 
 130. Policy on Applying the Definition of Species under the Endangered Species Act to 
Pacific Salmon, 56 Fed. Reg. at 58,616. 
 131. Policy Regarding the Recognition of District Vertebrate Population Segments under 
the Endangered Species Act, 61 Fed. Reg. at 4722. 
 132. Id. at 4723. 
 133. Of course that does not come close to answering every practical question; the required 
degree of distinctness, in particular, remains hotly contested. 
 134. See supra notes 46–49 and accompanying text. 
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groups that are in the process of diverging toward new species but 
have not yet reached that level of differentiation. 
The conceptual focus, for all of these units, is now squarely on 
evolution. That gives taxonomic classification both a backward- and 
a forward-looking element: species share an evolutionary history and 
are expected to share an evolutionary fate. The emphasis in species 
(as well as in subspecies and ESU) identification, though, has been 
on the backward look. That is unavoidable, since it is impossible to 
observe the evolutionary future. Taxonomists look at morphology, 
genetics, ecology, and other traits (in varying combinations 
depending upon the practitioner‘s preferred species concept) to 
decide whether the group has diverged sufficiently from others to 
warrant separate treatment. 
It is not surprising that the ESA presents the taxonomy question 
the way it does. At the time the ESA was adopted, there were 
essentially two dominant views of species classification, either of 
which could have justified the approach the ESA took. The first was 
the Linnean essentialist view, which dominated early classification 
systems. The second was the Biological Species Concept.
135
 The 
essentialist view, tied as it is to the biblical creation story, still holds 
sway with a good portion of the American public.
136
 High-profile 
disputes over the merits of evolutionary theory versus the biblical 
 
 135. Alternative species concepts did not really begin to proliferate until the 1970s. For a 
discussion of the Biological Species Concept and the emergence of alternative models, see 
Kevin de Queiroz, Ernst Mayr and the Modern Concept of Species, 102 PROC. NAT‘L ACAD. 
SCI. 6600, 6600–01 (2005). 
 136. There is no direct polling on what Americans think the word ―species‖ signifies. But 
over the past twenty years there has been regular polling on their view of evolution, particularly 
as it relates to the origins of the human species. Two 2009 polls, one by Gallup and the other by 
the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, found that well under a majority believe 
in evolution. Frank Newport, On Darwin’s Birthday, Only 4 in 10 Believe in Evolution, 
GALLUP, Feb. 11, 2009, http://www.gallup.com/poll/114544/Darwin-Birthday-Believe-
Evolution.aspx (thirty-nine percent of respondents said that they ―believe in the theory of 
evolution‖); News Release, Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, Scientific 
Achievements Less Prominent Than a Decade Ago: Public Praises Science; Scientists Fault 
Public, Media 38 (July 9, 2009), http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/528.pdf (thirty-two percent 
of the total public believe human beings evolved through natural processes). Belief in evolution 
may have increased in recent years. A compilation of poll results from 1982 to 2006 found that 
the belief that humans evolved through natural processes varied from a low of nine percent to a 
high of fifteen percent. Eric Plutzer & Michael Berkman, Trends: Evolution, Creationism, and 
the Teaching of Human Origins in Schools, 72 PUB. OPINION Q. 540, 545 (2008). 
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creation story were in full swing when the ESA was drafted.
137
 Laws 
prohibiting the teaching of evolution were still a fresh memory, and 
textbooks had just begun to deal openly with the topic.
138
 
No battle with fundamentalists was necessary to pass the ESA. 
Creationism is not inconsistent with a desire for conservation.
139
 
Treatment of taxonomy in the law did not need to challenge 
creationist views. Although conceptually the BSC is tied to the theory 
of evolution, in practice its use tended to boil down to a search for 
morphological differences. Taxonomists in the 1960s and 1970s were 
mostly using Linnaean tools, and getting Linnaean answers. Not all, 
but certainly many, BSC-recognized species corresponded closely 
with groups recognized as distinct long before the development of 
evolutionary theory. Static (or essentialist) and evolutionary views of 
species coexisted easily in the legislative reports and statements that 
preceded the Act‘s passage.140 It is entirely possible that many 
legislators held both views of species simultaneously. 
There is little in the legislative history to explain the inclusion of 
subspecies and DPSs within the law‘s coverage. Perhaps that was 
another way the law‘s scope was quietly expanded by insiders. It 
seems more likely, though, that there was a vague sense that species 
lines would not always protect what the law‘s supporters thought was 
important. The law‘s drafters may have noticed some of the 
discrepancies in taxonomic treatment among different groups and not 
wanted the law to replicate those discrepancies. Or they may have 
looked to fisheries practice, which traditionally had managed fish 
species as ―stocks,‖ without implying anything particular about the 
origin or evolutionary significance of those groups. Whatever the 
explanation, acknowledging the existence of and providing protection 
for subspecies and some populations is not necessarily inconsistent 
with a view of species as unchanging creations of the almighty. After 
all, human classifiers are fallible, and Congress had recognized that it 
 
 137. See, e.g., Nicholas Wade, Creationists and Evolutionists: Confrontation in California, 
178 SCI. 724 (1972). 
 138. See id. at 728. 
 139. Willett Kempton found that a majority of Americans agreed with the statement 
―[b]ecause God created the natural world, it is wrong to abuse it.‖ WILLETT KEMPTON ET AL., 
ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES IN AMERICAN CULTURE 91 (1995). 
 140. Doremus, supra note 47, at 1092–93. 
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was sometimes desirable to protect local occurrences even if a 
species were secure at the global level.
141
 
Nor is it surprising that the Services have struggled to answer the 
taxonomy question as the ESA presents it. Species and their 
subdivisions are not wholly discrete entities; there is therefore no 
objective way to draw a line marking when a new species has become 
separate from its progenitor. The principles that have been 
articulated, for example identifying evolutionary lineages, are 
difficult to put into practice and do not enjoy universal acceptance. 
As one systematist puts it, distinguishing one species from a close 
relative is like trying to fix the boundary between childhood and 
adulthood.
142
 The natural boundaries are even less clear below the 
species level. Nonetheless, like most laws, the ESA requires that lines 
be drawn—in this case to separate the protected from the 
unprotected. Add to the mix that many people assume that the line-
drawing exercise should be both easy and objective, and the agencies 
are faced with a very difficult practical and political problem. 
The problem of deciding which groups merit protection and which 
do not is now widely acknowledged, albeit not solved. For purposes 
of this Article, I want to emphasize a different problem that has 
received much less attention: the fact that the ESA frames the 
taxonomy issue in a static way. That was very much the scientific 
perspective of the time. Biologists like Mayr were aware that 
evolution had produced the biotic world around them but thought of 
evolution as an historical process. Although they knew that evolution 
was never over, they did not think it occurred at time scales relevant 
to human decision-making. 
B. Conservation Strategies and the Wilderness Fallacy 
In addition to taking a static view of species, the ESA takes a 
static view of the places where species live, and therefore of the work 
 
 141. See id. at 1093–94 (noting that inclusion of the term ―any other group of fish or 
wildlife . . . that interbreed when mature‖ in the 1973 ESA can be traced to the coverage of 
―population stocks‖ in the Marine Mammal Protection Act, and that the inclusion of stocks in 
the MMPA was intended to ensure protection of polar bears in the United States, regardless of 
their taxonomic relationship to other arctic bears). 
 142. See Marris, supra note 44, at 251 (quoting Scott Steppan). 
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needed to protect those places and their inhabitants. Again, this is not 
an interpretation that is explicitly written into the law. But it is an 
important aspect of the way the law works on the ground. Like the 
assumption of static species, the assumption of static landscapes is 
unsurprising in light of what was known about the problem of 
extinction at the time, the history of conservation efforts, and the 
political and practical challenges of more dynamic strategies. 
1. A Limited History 
There is no doubt that the ESA was broader in scope and stronger 
in its requirements than any prior conservation law in the U.S., and 
probably in the world. It did not, however, mark a radical shift in 
terms of conservation strategies. The history of public conservation 
efforts prior to the ESA involved only a few strategies: control of 
harvest, control of commerce, and the creation of publicly owned 
reserves. In practice, the ESA relies heavily on precisely those 
strategies. 
By 1973, the states had long regulated hunting and fishing,
143
 
backed up since 1900 by the federal Lacey Act,
144
 which prohibits the 
transport across state lines of wildlife taken in violation of state law. 
The federal government itself had been in the business of directly 
regulating some wildlife harvest since passage of the Migratory Bird 
Treaty Act in 1918
145
 and the addition of the Bald Eagle Protection 
Act in 1940.
146
 It had provided advice to the states on coastal 
fisheries regulation and had directly managed fisheries off of Alaska 
prior to statehood.
147
 
 
 143. Cf. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 527–28 (1896) (quoting Blackstone‘s 
commentaries for the proposition that hunting rights are subject to government restraint under 
the common law), overruled by Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979). 
 144. Act of May 25, 1900, ch. 553, 31 Stat. 187 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 701, 
3371–3378; 18 U.S.C. § 42 (2006)). 
 145. Migratory Bird Treaty Act, ch. 128, 40 Stat. 755 (1918) (codified as amended at 16 
U.S.C. §§ 703–712 (2006)). 
 146. Bald Eagle Protection Act, ch. 278, 54 Stat. 250 (1940) (codified as amended at 16 
U.S.C. §§ 668–668d (2006)). 
 147. See MICHAEL L. WEBER, FROM ABUNDANCE TO SCARCITY: A HISTORY OF U.S. 
MARINE FISHERIES POLICY 76–78 (2001). 
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Federal control of international and interstate commerce in 
wildlife began with the Lacey Act, which in addition to backstopping 
state hunting regulations with restrictions on interstate commerce also 
prohibited the import of a small number of foreign animals, and 
allowed the Secretary of Agriculture to add any species deemed 
injurious to agriculture to that list.
148
 Additional federal restrictions 
on commerce followed in the Black Bass Act,
149
 Migratory Bird 
Treaty Act,
150
 Bald Eagle Protection Act,
151
 and, shortly before the 
ESA‘s enactment, the Wild Horses and Burros Act152 and the Marine 
Mammal Protection Act of 1972.
153
 While the constitutionality of 
other federal conservation strategies frequently has been questioned, 
from an early date there was no serious doubt the federal government 
has the authority to regulate commerce in wildlife, wildlife parts, and 
products made from wildlife.
154
 
The third major conservation strategy was the designation of 
nature preserves, typically under public ownership. In the United 
States, federal preserves date back to the creation of Yellowstone 
National Park in 1872.
155
 The early U.S. national parks focused on 
the preservation of public access to spectacular scenic areas.
156
 Later, 
Congress created the national park system,
157
 and by the mid-
twentieth century it had expanded that system to include areas such 
as the Everglades, protected primarily for their unique biota rather 
than their scenery.
158
 Another preserve system, the National Wildlife 
Refuge System, got its start at roughly the same time as the national 
 
 148. § 2, 31 Stat. at 188. 
 149. Act of May 20, 1926, ch. 346, 44 Stat. 576. 
 150. § 2, 40 Stat. at 755. 
 151. 54 Stat. at 250. 
 152. Wild Horses and Burros Protection Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-195, 85 Stat. 649. 
 153. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-522, 86 Stat. 1027. 
 154. MICHAEL J. BEAN & MELANIE J. ROWLAND, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE 
LAW 39 (3d ed. 1997).  
 155. Act of March 1, 1872, ch. 24, 17 Stat. 32. Yosemite was actually set aside earlier as a 
preserve, but initially it was conveyed to California for management. Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 
184, 13 Stat. 325. It was returned to federal ownership in 1906. H.R.J. Res. 27, 49th Cong., 34 
Stat. 831 (1906). 
 156. ALFRED RUNTE, NATIONAL PARKS: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 28–47 (3d ed. 
1997). 
 157. Act of Aug. 25, 1916, ch. 408, § 1, 39 Stat. 535 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1–4 (2006)). 
 158. See MICHAEL GRUNWALD, THE SWAMP: THE EVERGLADES, FLORIDA, AND THE 
POLITICS OF PARADISE 208–09 (2006). 
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parks. It began with Theodore Roosevelt designating Pelican Island 
as a ―preserve and breeding ground for native birds‖ in 1903.159 With 
new acquisitions funded primarily by the Duck Stamp Act,
160
 by mid-
century the refuge system focused primarily on the conservation of 
migratory birds.
161
 
The triumvirate of harvest regulation, restrictions on commerce, 
and reserve creation that continues to dominate conservation policy 
has been appealing for several reasons. These strategies clearly were 
on sound legal ground in the early days of the conservation 
movement, when the validity of others seemed questionable, at least 
at the federal level.
162
 They address the most obvious threats to 
wildlife. Overharvest clearly was a problem for American wildlife by 
the turn of the century, when market hunting decimated such once-
abundant species as the bison and passenger pigeon.
163
 Restrictions 
on commerce reinforce restrictions on harvest by limiting the ability 
of poachers to profit from their misdeeds. Preserves address another 
threat to wildlife that became apparent in the mid-twentieth century: 
destruction of habitat. Purchased preserves (at least those that are 
purchased in voluntary transactions rather than by condemnation) 
also are politically appealing because they promote both the public 
interest in conservation and the private interest in using or profiting 
from land. 
The traditional triumvirate of conservation strategies assumes that 
what nature needs most is for people to leave it alone. Harvest 
restrictions tell people in no uncertain terms to leave enough of the 
target species alone to ensure its survival into the future. Commerce 
restrictions limit the economic incentives to violate harvest 
 
 159. Executive Order of March 14, 1903. 
 160. Duck Stamp Act, ch. 71, 48 Stat. 451 (1934). 
 161. For an excellent history of the refuge system in the U.S., see Robert L. Fischman, The 
National Wildlife Refuge System and the Hallmarks of Modern Organic Legislation, 29 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 457, 464–501 (2002). 
 162. See Holly Doremus, Patching the Ark: Improving Legal Protection of Biological 
Diversity, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 265, 292–93 (1991) (explaining that the scope of the commerce 
power was unclear prior to the New Deal). 
 163. See PAUL EHRLICH & ANNE EHRLICH, EXTINCTION: THE CAUSES AND 
CONSEQUENCES OF THE DISAPPEARANCE OF SPECIES 115–16 (1981); DAVID S. WILCOVE, THE 
CONDOR‘S SHADOW 27–30 (1999); Scott Farrow, Extinction and Market Forces: Two Case 
Studies, 13 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 115, 115–16 (1995); Dean Lueck, The Extermination and 
Conservation of the American Bison, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 609, 617–20 (2002). 
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restrictions. Preserves impose additional limits on human interactions 
with nature in specific places. They have traditionally been 
understood as places where nature‘s own processes could flourish. 
The idea that the best action for preserving nature is inaction—
that what is needed is not active human management but human 
restraint allowing nature to be its wild self—is apparent in the 
writings of early American preservationists like Henry David 
Thoreau,
164
 John Muir,
165
 and Aldo Leopold.
166
 It also dovetailed 
nicely with the theologically-inspired idea that nature had once been 
perfect in the Garden of Eden, before its disruption by human 
misbehavior.
167
 Ecologist Frederic Clements provided a scientific 
grounding for the ―hands-off‖ approach in the 1920s with his theory 
of succession. Clements argued that, left to its own devices, nature 
would reach a stable equilibrium point. As Fred Bosselman and Dan 
Tarlock have explained, Clements‘s theory, which ―dominated 
American ecology throughout the first half of the twentieth 
century,‖168 ―reinforced a static concept of the future landscape.‖169  
I do not mean to oversell the idea of natural stability. As both Dan 
Tarlock and Bryan Norton have pointed out, the ecologists of the day 
did not subscribe to a notion of perfectly stable nature.
170
 The world 
they observed had too much dynamism to ignore. But in their efforts 
to understand nature, they emphasized relative stability over flux. 
 
 164. See, e.g., 5 HENRY DAVID THOREAU, Walking, in THE WRITINGS OF HENRY DAVID 
THOREAU 205, 224 (―[I]n Wildness is the preservation of the world.‖). 
 165. See, e.g., JOHN MUIR, The Wild Parks and Forest Reservations of the West, in OUR 
NATIONAL PARKS 1, 4 (1901) (―None of Nature‘s landscapes are ugly so long as they are wild 
. . . .‖). 
 166. See, e.g., Aldo Leopold, The Wilderness and Its Place in Forest Recreational Policy, 
19 J. FORESTRY 718, 719 (1921) (arguing that large areas of the national forests should be ―kept 
devoid of roads, artificial trails, cottages, or other works of man‖). 
 167. Fred P. Bosselman & A. Dan Tarlock, The Influence of Ecological Science on 
American Law: An Introduction, 69 CHI. KENT L. REV. 847, 855 (1994). 
 168. Id. at 856. 
 169. Id. at 855. 
 170. See Bryan Norton, Change, Constancy, and Creativity: The New Ecology and Some 
Old Problems, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL‘Y F. 49, 53–54 (1996) (pointing out that Aldo Leopold 
and other ecologists of his era understood that nature was dynamic, often violating equilibrium 
assumptions); A. Dan Tarlock, The Nonequilibrium Paradigm in Ecology and the Partial 
Unraveling of Environmental Law, 27 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 1121, 1126 (1994) (noting that 
Tansley, a leading ecologist of the 1930s, described nature as a ―relatively stable dynamic 
equilibrium‖). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol32/iss1/7
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2010]  Static Law Meets Dynamic World 207 
 
 
When ecology was translated into common understanding, though, 
and combined with deep-seated notions of perfectability and 
essentialism, the subtleties were easily lost. So the popular picture 
became a static balance of nature. That static picture made a system 
of preserves within which human impacts would be minimized look 
like the perfect conservation strategy. 
2. Something Old is New Again 
The ESA incorporates all three of the traditional conservation 
policy strategies. Section 9 prohibits the ―take‖ of endangered fish or 
wildlife,
171
 and also forbids the import, export, interstate shipping, 
and sale in interstate or foreign commerce of endangered fish, 
wildlife, and plants.
172
 Threatened species are protected by ―such 
regulations as [the Secretary of Interior or Commerce] deems 
necessary and advisable to provide for [their] conservation‖ up to the 
full force of section 9.
173
 Section 5 authorizes land acquisition to 
conserve listed species.
174
 
The ESA is not explicitly limited to these three strategies. 
Notably, it defines ―take‖ quite broadly, so that prohibited actions 
include not just deliberate harvest but also other forms of harm.
175
 
FWS regulations define ―harm‖ as any ―act which actually kills or 
injures wildlife,‖ including ―significant habitat modification or 
degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly 
impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding 
or sheltering.‖176 The Supreme Court upheld that regulation in 
1995.
177
 
In addition, the ESA has another important regulatory provision, 
section 7, which provides that all federal actors must ensure that their 
actions do not jeopardize the continued existence of any listed 
species, or adversely modify habitat the Services have designated as 
 
 171. Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 9, 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B), (C) (2006). 
 172. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(A), (E), (F); § 1538(a)(2)(A), (C), (D). 
 173. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d). 
 174. Id. § 1534(a). 
 175. Id. § 1532(19). 
 176. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2008). 
 177. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 708 (1995). 
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critical.
178
 Section 7 allows the Services to insist on changes to the 
manner, extent, or location of any federal activity if necessary to 
protect listed species.
179
 
Nonetheless, in practice the Services‘ strategies both for limiting 
―take‖ and for implementing section 7 commonly boil down to the 
establishment of formal or informal preserved areas. With respect to 
section 7, the designation of critical habitat amounts to designation of 
(sharply) limited preserves. Critical habitat encompasses ―the specific 
areas within the geographical area occupied by the species . . . on 
which are found those physical or biological features (I) essential to 
the conservation of the species and (II) which may require special 
management considerations or protection‖; and specific areas outside 
the range that the Services determine ―are essential for the 
conservation of the species.‖180 Critical habitat designation has no 
direct effect on private actions; its statutory role is strictly confined to 
section 7. To the extent it does come into play,
181
 section 7‘s 
prohibition on adverse modification of critical habitat sets critical 
habitat areas aside from those federal actions that would interfere 
with the habitat elements needed by listed species. It takes a 
Clementsian view of nature, assuming that in the absence of human 
 
 178. Endangered Species Act of 1973, § 7, 16 U.S.C § 1536(a)(2) (2006). 
 179. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 169 (1997) (―By the Government‘s own account, 
while the Service‘s Biological Opinion theoretically serves an ―advisory function,‖ in reality it 
has a powerful coercive effect on the action agency.‖) (citation omitted); Holly Doremus, 
Water, Population Growth, and Endangered Species in the West, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 361, 
382–84 (2001) (explaining the consultation process, and noting that although Services‘ 
biological opinions are not formally binding on action agencies, they ―are virtually 
determinative of the outcome‖). 
 180. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A). 
 181. Its role has been limited even with respect to federal actions, because the Services‘ 
regulatory definitions make it virtually impossible for an action to adversely modify critical 
habitat without also jeopardizing the continued existence of the species. The Services have 
defined jeopardy to include actions ―that reasonably would be expected, directly or indirectly, 
to reduce appreciably the likelihood of both the survival and recovery‖ of the species in the 
wild. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2008). They have defined adverse modification of critical habitat as 
―a direct or indirect alteration that appreciably diminishes the value of critical habitat for both 
the survival and recovery of a listed species.‖ Id. Although the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have 
found the definition of adverse modification unlawfully narrow, the Services have not yet 
revised it. See Donald C. Baur, Michael J. Bean & Wm. Robert Irvin, A Recovery Plan for the 
Endangered Species Act, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,006, 10,009 (2009). 
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action habitat will remain stable, and therefore will continue to 
support its tenant species. 
With respect to section 9, the Services have been unwilling to 
push their authority to its limits. In part, this is a matter of politics. 
Resentment of the ESA is common in local communities, and that 
resentment can readily make its way up to the national level. 
Beginning with oversight hearings in 1979, shortly after TVA v. Hill 
brought home the power of the law, the Services regularly have been 
reminded ―that aggressive implementation of the ESA might lead to 
its repeal.‖182 But there is more to their timidity than politics. Until 
the Supreme Court decided Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter,
183
 it was 
not clear how far the authority to regulate indirect habitat 
modification extended. Even after Sweet Home Chapter, confusion 
remains, because a majority of the Court endorsed the idea that 
proximate cause is a necessary element of a section 9 violation.
184
 
Furthermore, it can be difficult to prove harm to an identifiable 
individual of the species, as Sweet Home Chapter also requires.
185
 
Because of those difficulties, even litigious environmental groups 
have made little use of section 9. 
When it is enforced or when a cautious potential defendant 
volunteers to meet its requirements,
186
 section 9 frequently results in 
the establishment of one or more preserves. Since 1982, section 10 of 
the ESA has allowed the Services to issue ―incidental take‖ permits 
authorizing actions that otherwise would violate section 9.
187
 In order 
 
 182. Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management, the Endangered Species Act, and the 
Institutional Challenges of “New Age” Environmental Protection, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 50, 58 
(2001). For insider accounts of how that political dynamic played out during the Clinton 
administration, when the Republicans controlled Congress, see John D. Leshy, The Babbitt 
Legacy at the Department of the Interior: A Preliminary View, 31 ENVTL. L. 199 (2001); 
Joseph L. Sax, Environmental Law at the Turn of the Century: A Reportorial Fragment of 
Contemporary History, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2375 (2000). 
 183. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995). 
 184. Id. at 708. 
 185. Id. 
 186. For an examination of the HCP permit process from the perspective of a potential land 
developer, see J.B. Ruhl, How to Kill Endangered Species, Legally: The Nuts and Bolts of 
Endangered Species Act “HCP” Permits for Real Estate Development, 5 ENVTL. LAW. 345 
(1999).  
 187. Endangered Species Act of 1973, § 10, 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B) (2006). For the 
story of adoption of this provision and its early years, see Robert D. Thornton, Searching for 
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to obtain an incidental take permit, the applicant must prepare a 
―habitat conservation plan‖ (―HCP‖), and the relevant Service must 
make three primary findings: (1) that the taking is incidental to, and 
not the purpose of, the proposed activity; (2) that the impacts of the 
taking will be minimized and mitigated to the maximum extent 
practicable; and (3) that issuance of the permit will not violate the 
prohibition on jeopardy.
188
 To date, the vast majority of incidental 
take permits issued have allowed land development or extractive use 
of terrestrial resources (such as timber harvest). The dominant 
strategy for mitigating the take of endangered species has been the 
setting aside of designated preserves.
189
 
At the time the ESA was adopted, it was entirely predictable—and 
probably unavoidable—that the new law would rely on these three 
traditional conservation strategies. They were familiar and clearly 
within federal authority. They addressed the two major recognized 
threats to species: overharvest and habitat loss. With the ―balance of 
nature‖ theory in the ascendant, they seemed scientifically sound.190 
 
Consensus and Predictability: Habitat Conservation Planning under the Endangered Species 
Act of 1973, 21 ENVTL. L. 605 (1991). 
 188. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B). The ―no jeopardy‖ requirement comes not just from 
the explicit terms of section 10, but also from section 7, since the issuance of an incidental take 
permit is a federal action subject to section 7. 
 189. That was the strategy of the first) (San Bruno Mountain) conservation plan, on which 
the HCP program was modeled, Thornton, supra note 187, at 621–23; and the second (in the 
Coachella Valley), Timothy Beatley, Balancing Urban Development and Endangered Species: 
The Coachella Valley Habitat Conservation Plan, 16 ENVTL. MGMT. 7 (1992). A 1997 study 
found that conservation easements, land acquisition, and habitat restoration were among the 
conservation strategies included in HCPs. See Laura Watchman, Martha Groom & John Perrine, 
Science and Uncertainty in Habitat Conservation Planning, 89 AM. SCIENTIST 351 (2001). The 
large regional plans, by far the most important aspect of the program, continue to rely on a 
primary strategy of assembling reserves on the basis of standardized fees assessed to 
developers. See NRDC v. Kempthorne, 506 F. Supp. 2d 322 (E.D. Cal. 2007) (describing the 
Natomas Basin HCP). In the Bush administration, the Services also incorporated habitat 
―banking,‖ which allows the private creation of reserves and sale of credits, into the HCP 
program. See J.B. Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive Management—Is It Possible?, 7 MINN. J. L. 
SCI. & TECH. 21, 43–44 (2005). 
 190. The writings of Eugene and Howard Odum, primary supporters of that theory, were 
widely read by non-scientists. Bosselman & Tarlock, supra note 167, at 866. 
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C. Conservation Planning and the Rule of Law Fallacy 
Finally, the ESA takes a static view of the law. In part, this static 
view is a product of the ESA‘s focus on a reserve strategy, which is 
difficult to make dynamic; in part, it is a product of the human desire 
for stability and discomfort with change; and in part, it is based on a 
misreading of the nature of law.  
Once again, caveats are in order. In some respects, the ESA is 
anything but static. The list of protected species changes constantly 
with additions, deletions, and status revisions. The Secretary of the 
Interior is required to review the status of each listed species every 
five years
191
 and can be prodded to undertake status reviews for other 
species or at other times by citizen petitions.
192
 Section 7 consultation 
is also dynamic; the process must be restarted if, while discretionary 
federal action remains, a new affected species is listed, new 
information shows that the impacts are worse than expected, or the 
permissible take specified in the biological opinion is exceeded.
193
 
Nonetheless, in an important respect, the ESA as implemented 
prohibits the updating of legal obligations. Incidental take permittees 
are routinely promised that if species decline notwithstanding their 
implementation of an approved HCP, they will not be required to 
give more to the conservation cause. This ―no surprises‖ policy was 
first implemented informally by FWS during the Clinton 
administration to make the HCP program attractive to landowners.
194
 
Premised on the simple notion that ―a deal is a deal,‖195 no-surprises 
is intended to assure permittees that the government will not change 
the legal rules in the middle of the game. As later written into 
regulations, it provides that if additional conservation measures prove 
necessary because of ―unforeseen circumstances‖ during the duration 
 
 191. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(c)(2) (2006). 
 192. Id. § 1533(b)(3). 
 193. 50 C.F.R. § 402.16 (2008). 
 194. See Donald J. Barry, Keynote Speech, Opportunity in the Face of Danger: The 
Pragmatic Development of Habitat Conservation Plans, 14 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & 
POL‘Y 867, 867–68 (2008); News Release, Dep‘t of the Interior, Administration‘s New 
Assurance Policy Tells Landowners: ―No Surprises‖ in Endangered Species Planning (Aug. 11, 
1994), http://www.eswr.com/august07/199940811fwsnosurpr.pdf [hereinafter News Release, 
Dep‘t of the Interior]. 
 195. See News Release, Dep‘t of the Interior, supra note 194. 
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of the permit, those measures ―will not involve the commitment of 
additional land, water or financial compensation or additional 
restrictions on the use of land, water, or other natural resources 
otherwise available for development or use under the original terms 
of the conservation plan without the consent of the permittee.‖196 The 
regulations allow incidental take permits to provide for changes in 
conservation measures in response to ―changed circumstances,‖197 but 
any change in circumstances not specifically addressed in the HCP 
and associated incidental take permit cannot be the basis for 
additional conservation requirements.
198
 The ―no surprises‖ policy 
puts pressure on the Services to negotiate terms that impose increased 
conservation obligations when triggering events occur. Since the 
premise of the no surprises program from its outset was that 
landowners would not agree to permit terms without strong 
assurances that they would not be required to do more in the future, it 
is not surprising that the Services have not proven to be strong 
negotiators. As a result, most HCPs do not require modification if the 
initial mitigation procedures are insufficient to protect the intended 
species.
199
 
The insistence on static conservation requirements for private 
landowners is primarily a product of uncertainty about the extent of 
legal authority to require more of them and certainty about the extent 
of political resistance that would occur if heightened obligations were 
imposed. There has always been a lack of clarity about the outer 
boundary of the Services‘ statutory and constitutional power to 
restrict the use of private property in order to protect listed species.
200
 
The statutory uncertainty was resolved in 1995, when the Supreme 
Court issued its decision in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter 
Communities for a Great Oregon, upholding the Services‘ 
interpretation of ―harm‖ as including habitat modification that 
 
 196. 50 C.F.R. § 17.22(b)(5)(iii)(B) (2008) (for endangered species); Id. § 17.32(b)(5) 
(iii)(B) (2008) (for threatened species). 
 197. 50 C.F.R. § 17.22(b)(5)(i); Id. § 17.32(b)(5)(i). 
 198. 50 C.F.R. § 17.22(b)(5)(ii); Id. § 17.32(b)(5)(ii). 
 199. Alejandro E. Camacho, Can Regulation Evolve? Lessons from a Study in Maladaptive 
Management, 55 UCLA L. REV. 293, 332–33 (2007). 
 200. See, e.g., Fred P. Bosselman, The Statutory and Constitutional Mandate for a No 
Surprises Policy, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 707, 729–34 (1997). 
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actually kills or injures protected animals.
201
 It is telling that the case 
made it all the way to the Supreme Court, where three Justices would 
have read the statute to provide for habitat protection only through 
federal land acquisition.
202
 There remains uncertainty about 
constitutional boundaries of the ESA‘s regulatory provisions today.203 
There never has been any doubt that pushing the legal boundaries 
of the ESA‘s regulatory power, wherever they might lie, would 
arouse political resistance.
204
 When he was Secretary of Interior, 
Bruce Babbitt made it clear that he believed the Act should not be 
stretched to its constitutional limits.
205
 The no surprises policy is one 
way to prevent regulatory excess. 
The no surprises policy also rests on the idea that because 
government has the power to change rules it must provide strong 
reassurances to its negotiating partners that it will not do so. That is 
an understandable view for a government anxious to find negotiating 
partners, and one with powerful political resonance. But it elides an 
important aspect of the governance problem. Rules must change as 
the world, our understanding of it, and societal goals change. Legal 
rules necessarily are not fixed in stone. Legislatures cannot bind their 
successors,
206
 and courts are free to reconsider past doctrine.
207
  
Changes in the law are not supposed to be easy because, in the 
words of Justice Brandeis, ―in most matters it is more important that 
the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.‖208 
Tensions are particularly high, and the doctrine correspondingly 
 
 201. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995). 
 202. Id. at 714 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 203. Compare Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 543 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2008), 
and Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 532 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2008), with Tulare Lake 
Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313 (Ct. Cl. 2001). 
 204. See supra notes 182–87 and accompanying text. 
 205. Bruce Babbitt, The Endangered Species Act and “Takings”: A Call for Innovation 
within the Terms of the Act, 24 ENVTL. L. 355, 361–62 (1994). 
 206. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 135–36 (1810). 
 207. See, e.g., Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205, 212 (1910) (―The rule of stare decisis, 
though one tending to consistency and uniformity of decision, is not inflexible. Whether it shall 
be followed or departed from is a question entirely within the discretion of the court, which is 
again called upon to consider a question once decided.‖). 
 208. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). For an analysis of legal transition costs, see Michael P. Van Alstine, The Costs of 
Legal Change, 49 UCLA L. REV. 789 (2002). 
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difficult to sort out, when the government seeks to change rules that 
are foundational to a contract by which it has agreed to be bound.
209
  
Nonetheless, a deal with the government is not always 
unshakeable. Under the Sovereign Acts doctrine, the government 
retains the power to legislate in ways that affect earlier contracts.
210
 
Moreover, since the problem with changing the rules after a deal has 
been made is one of surprise, the government can negotiate contracts 
that explicitly incorporate the prospect of change. There is no legal 
barrier to a habitat conservation plan agreement that would require 
permittees to make additional conservation efforts if necessary to 
ensure the survival of the species. 
While it is mostly about politics and authority, the no surprises 
policy also illustrates the continuing influence of the equilibrium 
vision of nature. If nature tends toward equilibrium, it should be 
possible to predict the future state of reserves. An HCP should work 
if the Services correctly identify the lands to be set aside. Under the 
equilibrium vision, therefore, government has only itself to blame if 
HCPs prove insufficient. But if nature is dynamic, it is much more 
difficult to predict. The non-equilibrium view undermines the 
expectation that experts can accurately foresee the future and know 
 
 209. The badly fractured opinion of the Court in United States v. Winstar, 518 U.S. 839 
(1996), is perhaps the best illustration of the difficulties of resolving these issues when 
powerful interests in stability collide with equally powerful interests in allowing necessary 
change. 
 210. Bowen v. Pub. Agencies Opposed to Soc. Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 52 (1986). 
The Court held: 
While the Federal Government, as sovereign, has the power to enter contracts that 
confer vested rights, and the concomitant duty to honor those rights, we have declined 
in the context of commercial contracts to find that a ‗sovereign forever waives the 
right to exercise one of its sovereign powers unless it expressly reserves the right to 
exercise that power in‘ the contract. Rather, we have emphasized that without regard to 
its source, sovereign power, even when unexercised, is an enduring presence that 
governs all contracts subject to the sovereign‘s jurisdiction, and will remain intact 
unless surrendered in unmistakable terms. Therefore, contractual arrangements, 
including those to which a sovereign itself is party, remain subject to subsequent 
legislation by the sovereign.  
Id. (quoting Merrion v. Jicarella Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 148 1982) (internal citations 
omitted. See also Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 677 (Fed. Cl. 2007) 
(holding that Sovereign Acts doctrine provided a defense to breach of contract claims based on 
reductions in water deliveries from a federal irrigation project for the benefit of species listed 
under the ESA). 
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how to get there.
211
 Under the non-equilibrium view, it is more 
important to be able to adjust conservation strategies over time and 
less obvious that the government should bear the costs of any 
imperfections in the initial predictions. 
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING DYNAMIC 
The ESA‘s static view of species, landscapes, and conservation 
obligations, while entirely understandable, has become a hindrance to 
effective conservation. The ESA‘s lofty goals of conserving species 
and the ecosystems upon which they depend cannot be achieved 
without a more realistic vision of the dynamic qualities of nature and 
the ability to respond to the changes that are inevitable in dynamic 
systems. 
A. Accounting for Evolution 
Conceptually, modern taxonomy focuses on evolution; it aims to 
recognize groups that are on evolutionarily separate paths.
212
 But 
several aspects of the practice of taxonomy have made it difficult for 
implementation of the ESA to accurately reflect the evolutionary 
present or forecast the evolutionary future. Taxonomy is both a 
highly conservative and an underfunded discipline. As a result, 
formally recognized taxonomic categories change slowly, and, as the 
saga of the orca shows,
213
 do not always represent the best and most 
current understanding of the relationships among groups. This 
problem sounds easy to fix—it seems to require only that the 
Services consult the top scientists currently working in the field, not 
just the dusty standard taxonomic reference. 
Of course, that significantly understates the practical difficulty of 
the task. It is not always easy for an outsider to locate criticisms of 
 
 211. See Timothy H. Profeta, Managing without a Balance: Environmental Regulation in 
Light of Ecological Advances, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL‘Y F. 71, 75 (1996) (―[I]f ecosystems 
are dynamic, shifting systems . . . resources must be regulated under considerable and ever-
changing uncertainty.‖); William H. Rodgers, Jr., Adaptation of Environmental Law to the 
Ecologists’ Discovery of Disequilibria, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 887, 887–88 (1994) (noting that 
non-equilibrium theory undermines the theory of comprehensive rationality in management). 
 212. See supra notes 45–53 and accompanying text. 
 213. See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text. 
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existing taxonomic groups, which may be found predominantly in the 
grey literature or even in the informal conversations of scientists. It is 
even more challenging to update taxonomic categories where 
taxonomists have not done so. In the absence of a clear consensus 
among the field‘s practitioners, the Services will need to make 
difficult choices, often from a position of non-expertise.
214
 Political 
pressures make these choices especially difficult; the Services may be 
reluctant to aggressively revise or challenge standard taxonomy for 
fear of calling the legitimacy of the ESA into question. 
It is even more difficult to ensure that the identification of 
protectable entities takes account of the evolutionary future as well as 
the evolutionary past. The goal of much modern taxonomy is to look 
to the future: taxonomists seek to distinguish between independently 
evolving populations, which have the potential to develop unique 
adaptations. That focus coincides well with what many scientists 
believe should be the primary goal of conservation efforts—to ensure 
the current and future functioning of evolutionary processes.
215
 Yet, 
because of the limited palette of tools available to evaluate 
divergence and the assumption that evolution is a slow process 
relative to the time scale of human decision-making, the field practice 
of taxonomy remains focused on the past. That is true at every 
taxonomic level.
216
 
 
 214. See Holly Doremus, Data Gaps in Natural Resource Management: Sniffing for Leaks 
along the Information Pipeline, 83 IND. L.J. 407, 441–42 (2008) (observing that in deciding 
whether to list the Puget Sound population of killer whales, NMFS was faced with a taxonomic 
community that agreed the standard taxonomy of the species was wrong but did not agree on a 
replacement). 
 215. See, e.g., Keith A. Crandall et al., Considering Evolutionary Processes in 
Conservation Biology, 15 TRENDS ECOLOGY & EVOLUTION, 290, 293 (2000) (describing 
primary conservation goals as ―to preserve adaptive diversity and evolutionary processes across 
the geographic range of a species‖); Haig et al., supra note 89, at 1590 (asserting that the ESA 
provides for protection of groups or populations in order to conserve evolutionary potential); 
Amy G. Vandergast et al., Are Hotspots of Evolutionary Potential Adequately Protected in 
Southern California?, 141 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 1648, 1648 (2008) (―Across a variety 
of biological subdisciplines, there is growing recognition that conservation should aim to 
protect not only key species and populations . . . but also the evolutionary processes that create 
and sustain these patterns.‖ (citation omitted)). 
 216. Fraser and Bernatchez explain that a variety of methods for identifying ESUs (in a 
taxonomic rather than a regulatory sense) emphasize historic isolation. Fraser & Bernatchez, 
supra note 53, at 2742–44. See also Crandall et al., supra note 215, at 290 (noting that ―efforts 
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The focus on the past is problematic in two different respects. 
First, taxonomy that overemphasizes the past ignores the fact that 
evolution can occur within a matter of decades or even years.
217
 This 
phenomenon, known as ―contemporary evolution,‖ is familiar to 
biology students from the story of the peppered moth, which rapidly 
changed its coloring after the industrial revolution to better hide on 
soot-blackened tree bark.
218
 Until recently, that sort of rapid evolution 
was thought to be rare,
219
 but examples have now begun to pile up. 
Hunting and fishing pressure can drive rapid evolutionary change, 
such as the development of tuskless elephants in Africa and Asia, 
small-horned bighorn sheep in the Rocky Mountains, and fish that 
mature without growing big.
220
 Other selective pressures can also 
lead to rapid evolution. Introduced predators appear to have caused a 
significant shift toward nocturnal behavior in the Santa Cruz Island 
fox within the span of eleven years.
221
 Earlier springs mediated by 
global climate change have caused red squirrels in Canada to breed 
earlier; some of that difference apparently is due to behavioral 
plasticity, but some is genetic.
222
 
Second, by overemphasizing historic genetic isolation, the static 
species paradigm creates evidentiary difficulties and fails to 
acknowledge that isolation is not an essential prerequisite to 
evolution. Recent genetic separation may be evolutionarily 
significant but difficult to detect through genetic analysis,
223
 
especially if that analysis relies on ―neutral‖ genetic markers. 
 
to document ESUs have emphasized reproductive isolation rather than the maintenance of 
adaptive differences‖). 
 217. For a discussion of ―rapid‖ or ―contemporary‖ evolution, see Craig A. Stockwell, 
Andrew P. Hendry & Michael T. Kinnison, Contemporary Evolution Meets Conservation 
Biology, 18 TRENDS IN ECOLOGY & EVOLUTION 94 (2003). 
 218. Bob Holmes, In the Blink of an Eye, NEW SCIENTIST, July 9, 2005, at 28.  
 219. There was evidence by the mid-1980s that contemporary evolution was relatively 
common, see, e.g., JOHN A. ENDLER, NATURAL SELECTION IN THE WILD (1986), but it was not 
until the next decade that studies confirming the phenomenon began to proliferate. S.P. Carroll 
et al., Evolution on Ecological Time-Scales, 21 FUNCTIONAL ECOLOGY 387, 389 (2007). 
 220. See Carroll et al., supra note 219, at 389; Stockwell et al., supra note 217, at 97. 
 221. H.M. Swarts et al., Possible Contemporary Evolution in an Endangered Species, the 
Santa Cruz Island Fox, 12 ANIMAL CONSERVATION 120, 123–24 (2009). 
 222. Denis Reale et al., Genetic and Plastic Responses of a Northern Mammal to Climate 
Change, 270 PROC. ROYAL SOC‘Y LONDON B 591 (2003). 
 223. See Matthew A. Cronin, Systematics, Taxonomy, and the Endangered Species Act: 
The Example of the California Gnatcatcher, 25 WILDLIFE SOC‘Y BULL. 661, 664 (1997). 
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Furthermore, genetic divergence can occur in the absence of strong 
genetic isolation if there is some selective pressure.
224
 Even rapid 
evolution is possible in the presence of gene flow.
225
 
NMFS‘s struggles to identify appropriate units of conservation 
concern in Pacific salmon illustrate the problems created by focusing 
on demonstrable past genetic divergence. Counting cutthroat trout 
and steelhead, there are seven recognized species of Pacific 
salmonids.
226
 Within those species, salmon do not have a highly 
articulated formal taxonomic structure, but they do show 
considerable genetic, behavioral, and ecological variation from 
stream to stream, and even within a single stream. Beginning in the 
1940s, some salmon biologists recognized fish that spawned in a 
particular location at a particular time as stocks.
227
 The existence of 
discrete stocks remained contested until about 1980,
228
 and there was 
never a formal consensus on recognized stocks. When fisheries 
scientists, environmental groups, and Indian tribes began petitioning 
for the protection of Pacific salmon under the ESA, NMFS had to 
decide what units should be the focus of conservation concern. It 
responded with the ESU Policy, which identifies populations that are 
substantially reproductively isolated and represent an important 
component of the evolutionary legacy of the species as listable 
entities.
229
 
The ESU policy is never easy to apply; it requires drawing 
seemingly arbitrary lines between stocks.
230
 But the line-drawing is 
particularly challenging—and controversial—with respect to 
hatchery-spawned fish. 
 
 224. See Haig et al., supra note 89, at 1591. 
 225. See Carroll et al., supra note 219; Stockwell et al., supra note 217, at 94–95. 
 226. R.S. Waples et al., Characterizing Diversity in Salmon from the Pacific Northwest, 59 
J. FISH BIOLOGY 1, 1 (Supp. A 2001). 
 227. Willa Nehlsen, Jack E. Williams & James A. Lichatowich, Pacific Salmon at the 
Crossroads: Stocks at Risk from California, Oregon, Idaho, and Washington, 16 FISHERIES 4, 5 
(1991). 
 228. Id. at 6. 
 229. See supra notes 123–24 and accompanying text. 
 230. See Holly Doremus & A. Dan Tarlock, Science, Judgment, and Controversy in 
Natural Resource Regulation, 26 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 1, 14–15 (2005) 
(explaining the complexities of identifying ESUs for coho salmon on the Oregon and California 
coasts). 
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Fish hatcheries were developed in the nineteenth century to 
compensate for heavy harvesting pressure and loss of habitat in 
increasingly industrialized rivers.
231
 Construction of the first Pacific 
salmon hatchery began in 1872.
232
 By 1930, some seventy-three 
hatcheries on the Pacific Coast were putting massive numbers of fry 
and juveniles in the region‘s rivers every year.233 Although early 
hatchery practices seem to have done at least as much harm as good 
to salmon abundance,
234
 the hatchery experiment rolled on. By 1981, 
―the network of hatcheries along the coast from California to Alaska 
released an estimated 1.06 billion artificially reared salmon 
juveniles.‖235 According to NMFS, there are now some 365 hatchery 
programs in the Pacific Northwest alone,
236
 releasing about 300 
million young fish annually.
237
 Another source reports that over six 
billion smolts are released in the Pacific Rim.
238
 Hatchery fish 
dominate the catch in many of the region‘s commercial fisheries.239 
 
 231. JAMES A. LICHATOWICH, SALMON WITHOUT RIVERS: A HISTORY OF THE PACIFIC 
SALMON CRISIS 114–23 (1999). 
 232. Id. at 123. 
 233. Id. at 143. 
 234. Id. at 143–44. 
 235. Michael L. Goodman, Comment, Preserving the Genetic Diversity of Salmonid 
Stocks: A Call for Federal Regulation of Hatchery Programs, 20 ENVTL. L. 111, 124 (1990). 
 236. NOAA‘s National Marine Fisheries Service, Northwest Regional Office, Hatcheries 
(Artificial Propagation), http://www.nwr.noaa.gov/Salmon-Harvest-Hatcheries/Hatcheries/ (last 
visited Apr. 20, 2010). 
 237. U.S. DEP‘T OF COMMERCE, NAT‘L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., NAT‘L 
MARINE FISHERIES SERV., TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM NMFS-NWR/SWR, SALMONID 
HATCHERY INVENTORY AND EFFECTS EVALUATION REPORT, 2-1 (2004), http://www.nwr.noaa. 
gov/Publications/upload/SHIEER.pdf. 
 238. R.J. Beamish, C. Mahnken and C.M. Neville, Hatchery and Wild Production of 
Pacific Salmon in Relation to Large-Scale Natural Shifts in the Productivity of the Marine 
Environment, 54 ICES J. MARINE SCI. 1200, 1206 (1997). 
 239. ―Depending on species and area, the salmon enhancement programs in the U.S. 
Pacific Northwest produce as much as 70 to 90% of salmon harvested in the commercial and 
recreational fisheries.‖ GUNNAR KNAPP, CATHY A. ROHEIM & JAMES L. ANDERSON, THE 
GREAT SALMON RUN: COMPETITION BETWEEN WILD AND FARMED SALMON 54 (2007), http:// 
www.iser.uaa.alaska.edu/iser/people/Knapp/pubs/TRAFFIC/SalmonReport_Ch_4-Hatcheries.pdf. 
See also Phillip S. Levin & John G. Williams, Interspecific Effects of Artificially Propagated 
Fish: An Additional Conservation Risk for Salmon, 16 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1581, 1582 
(2002) (―Hatchery-reared salmon now dominate the salmonid fauna of the Columbia River 
Basin, with more than 95% of coho, 70% of spring-run chinook, 80% of summer-run chinook, 
50% of fall-run chinook, and 70% of steelhead adults reared in hatcheries.‖); XANTHIPPE 
AUGEROT, ATLAS OF PACIFIC SALMON 34–35 (2005) (stating that eighty percent of salmon 
harvest in the Pacific northwest is hatchery-derived). 
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Carefully managed hatcheries hold promise as conservation tools, 
although their value has yet to be demonstrated in practice.
240
 But 
hatchery fish also pose a threat to wild fish through competition, 
direct predation, attracting other predators by their sheer numbers, 
and gene swamping.
241
 
The ESU Policy does not directly address treatment of hatchery 
fish. In 1993, NMFS published an interim hatchery policy providing 
that hatchery fish would be evaluated along with wild ones for 
inclusion in ESUs, but would not be listed with their ESU unless 
deemed essential to the recovery of wild fish.
242
 That policy was 
overturned by a federal district court on the grounds that the statute 
did not permit the effective listing of a partial ESU.
243
 If an ESU 
includes both hatchery fish and wild fish, the court ruled, the decision 
whether to list the ESU must apply to both.
244
 Rather than appeal the 
decision, NMFS chose to redraft its hatchery policy. The new 
Hatchery Listing Policy, issued in 2005, again provides that hatchery 
fish will be included in ESUs with their genetically similar wild 
cousins.
245
 NMFS will decide whether to list the ESU based on the 
likelihood that natural self-sustaining populations can persist.
246
 
Although that decision will apply to both wild and hatchery-spawned 
members of the ESU, NMFS will exercise its discretion to issue 
 
 240. See generally NAT‘L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., NAT‘L MARINE FISHERIES 
SERV., NOAA TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM NMFS-NWFSC-38, A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
FOR CONSERVATION HATCHERY STRATEGIES FOR PACIFIC SALMONIDS (1999), http://www. 
nwfsc.noaa.gov/publications/techmemos/tm38/tm38.pdf. 
 241. Final Listing Determinations for 10 Distinct Population Segments of West Coast 
Steelhead, 71 Fed. Reg. 834, 857 (Jan. 5, 2006) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 223–224); 
Kathryn Kostow, Factors That Contribute to the Ecological Risks of Salmon and Steelhead 
Hatchery Programs and Some Mitigating Strategies, 19 REV. FISH BIOLOGY & FISHERIES 9 
(2009); Nicholas W. Vidargas, A Means to Conserve? Wild Salmon and Hatcheries under the 
Endangered Species Act, 32 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL‘Y J. 345, 355–58 (2009). 
 242. Interim Policy on Artificial Propagation of Pacific Salmon under the Endangered 
Species Act, 58 Fed. Reg. 17,573, 17,574–75 (Apr. 5, 1993). For a more detailed explanation of 
the events that led to the present hatchery policy, see Michael C. Blumm & Hallison T. Putnam, 
Imposing Judicial Restraints on the “Art of Deception”: The Courts Cast a Skeptical Eye on 
Columbia Basin Salmon Restoration Efforts, 38 ENVTL. L. 47, 70–76 (2008). 
 243. Alsea Valley Alliance v. Evans, 161 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1162–63 (D. Or. 2001). 
 244. Id. at 1163. 
 245. Policy on the Consideration of Hatchery-Origin Fish in Endangered Species Act 
Listing Determinations for Pacific Salmon and Steelhead, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,204, 37,215 (June 
28, 2005) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 223-224). 
 246. Id. 
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regulations under ESA section 4(d) allowing the selective take of 
hatchery fish from threatened ESUs.
247
 Two district courts split on 
the validity of the Hatchery Listing Policy.
248
 The Ninth Circuit 
upheld it, together with the downlisting of Upper Columbia River 
steelhead from endangered to threatened, based on the contribution of 
hatchery fish to the ESU‘s likelihood of persistence.249 
In promulgating the Hatchery Listing Policy, NMFS declined to 
reconsider its ESU policy or to apply that policy differently to 
hatchery than to wild fish. Surely that is in part a political choice, 
since refusing to treat hatchery fish as ESU-mates of wild fish would 
enhance the likelihood both that more ESUs would qualify for listing 
and that hatchery operations would have to be constrained to protect 
those ESUs. But it also follows directly from the framing of the ESU 
Policy and from the Services‘ taxonomic efforts more generally. 
Looking backward, many hatchery stocks do share a recent 
evolutionary history with the wild stocks from which they are 
derived. Furthermore, hatchery and wild fish typically are not entirely 
reproductively isolated once a hatchery is in operation; stray hatchery 
fish mate with their wild cousins, and wild fish provide gametes for 
the hatchery. 
The problem lies in the other temporal direction; hatchery fish and 
wild fish may share an evolutionary past, but they have distinct 
evolutionary futures. Hatchery fish face strong selective pressures 
unlike anything experienced by wild-spawned fish. They can evolve 
rapidly under those pressures; for steelhead, fitness in the wild 
declines noticeably within just one or two hatchery generations.
250
 
 
 247. Id. NMFS concurrently issued such rules in its revised listing determinations for 
sixteen salmon ESUs. Final Listing Determinations for 16 ESUs of West Coast Salmon and 
Final 4(d) Protective Regulations for Threatened Salmonid ESUs, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,160 (June 
28, 2005). 
 248. See Trout Unlimited v. Lohn, No. CV 06-0483-JCC, 2007 WL 1795036 (W.D. Wash. 
June 13, 2007) (holding the Hatchery Listing Policy invalid), rev’d, 559 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 
2009); Alsea Valley Alliance v. Lautenbacher, No. 06-6093-HO, 2007 WL 2344927 (D. Or. 
2007) (finding the Hatchery Listing Policy valid). 
 249. Trout Unlimited v. Lohn, 559 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 250. Hitoshi Araki et al., Fitness of Hatchery-Reared Salmonids in the Wild, 1 
EVOLUTIONARY APPLICATIONS 342, 346 (2008). See also JODY HEY ET AL., CONSIDERING LIFE 
HISTORY, BEHAVIORAL, AND ECOLOGICAL COMPLEXITY IN DEFINING CONSERVATION UNITS 
FOR PACIFIC SALMON: AN INDEPENDENT PANEL REPORT, REQUESTED BY NOAA FISHERIES 8–
11 (2005), http://www.nwfsc.noaa.gov/trt/regarding_salmon_esus.pdf. 
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That divergence may show up quickly in behavior and fitness, but 
―may not be detectable with randomly selected or neutral molecular 
genetic markers,‖251 the tests most frequently used to evaluate 
reproductive isolation. As an advisory committee convened by 
NMFS put it, ―By holding to a phylogenetic criterion and 
overlooking a population perspective of exchangeability, salmon 
ESUs are sometimes treated largely as taxonomic units rather than as 
evolutionary and ecological role players.‖252 Because NMFS 
recognizes that hatchery and wild-spawned fish are not equivalent, it 
has turned itself inside out to avoid treating them equivalently when 
evaluating ESU status and imposing protective regulations. Adjusting 
the ESU policy would be more straightforward and easier to explain 
to the public. 
A more forward-looking taxonomic approach might also change 
the Services‘ approach to hybrids and subspecies. The Services 
understand that hybridization is not always a bad thing, but they tend 
to look at it only in hindsight. The 1996 proposed hybrid policy,
253
 
the approach to the red wolf, and treatment of the westslope cutthroat 
trout
254
 all focus on preserving the morphology of the past even if 
genetic purity is lost. From an evolutionary perspective, genetic 
purity is overrated. Hybridization can be a route to speciation.
255
 At 
the same time, hybridization is not always good. It may be either a 
natural phenomenon capable of creating a new evolutionary future or 
an unnatural commingling made possible only by human action. The 
westslope cutthroat trout, which has hybridized with non-native trout 
deliberately stocked in its range, is an example of such ―unnatural‖ 
hybridization.
256
 While ―natural‖ hybridization should neither be 
prevented nor prohibit protection, the better approach to ―unnatural 
 
 251. HEY ET AL., supra note 250, at 6. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Proposed Policy and Proposed Rule on the Treatment of Intercrosses and Intercross 
Progeny (the Issue of ―Hybridization‖), 61 Fed. Reg. 4710 (Feb. 7, 1996) (to be codified at 50 
C.F.R. pt. 424). 
 254. See supra notes 78–83 and accompanying text. 
 255. See Pamela S. Soltis & Douglas E. Soltis, The Role of Hybridization in Plant 
Speciation, 60 ANN. REV. PLANT BIOLOGY 561 (2009); James Mallet, Hybridization, 
Ecological Races, and the Nature of Species: Empirical Evidence for the Ease of Speciation, 
363 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC‘Y B 2971 (2008). 
 256. See supra notes 80–81 and accompanying text. 
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hybridization‖ seems to be to protect populations with the ―right‖ 
morphology and only limited genetic introgression (as FWS has done 
in the case of the WCT), while aggressively seeking to remove the 
interloper species to prevent further introgression.  
With respect to subspecies, focusing on the future might not 
change the outcome so much as the way it is explained. The Preble‘s 
meadow jumping mouse became a cause célèbre among conservation 
skeptics because it is easy to ridicule distinctions based on minor 
differences in the shape of the skull or in mitochondrial DNA 
sequences, and to malign the motives of those who insist on 
protecting such barely distinct rodents. The best explanation for 
continued recognition of the subspecies so far has been that there is 
not enough evidence to justify overturning a fifty-year-old taxonomy 
arrived at without conservation in mind. The sage grouse dispute 
shows many of the same characteristics: it boils down to a dispute 
over what it takes to overcome an old but formally recognized 
taxonomic classification. The public can be excused for confusion 
and disinterest in arguments conducted by experts in arcane language 
about genetic isolation and dusty taxonomic authorities. 
Turning the focus toward the future and explicitly factoring in the 
dynamism of evolution might change the tone and focus of the debate 
over subspecies recognition. It could force FWS to talk more about 
the conservation purposes served by recognizing subspecies or DPSs. 
That in turn would open up the discussion to more participants and 
relate it more directly to the goals of conservation policy. A forward-
looking approach will not end the controversy, but it might make the 
discussion and the consequences of the decision more transparent. 
The ESU and DPS Policies, because they are so focused on 
detectable genetic divergence, turn the Services‘ attention too much 
to the evolutionary past and too little to the evolutionary future. If 
one purpose of the ESA is to ensure that evolutionary processes can 
continue with minimal anthropogenic interference, the ESU and DPS 
policies need to be reconsidered. 
B. Accommodating a Changing Climate 
By the time the ESA was adopted, the limits of the static ―hands 
off‖ preserve strategy already had been noticed in other contexts. As 
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early as the 1950s, some preserve managers had become aware that 
their charges, left alone, were nonetheless changing right before their 
eyes. Daniel Botkin tells the story of the Hutchinson Memorial Forest 
Nature Preserve in New Jersey.
257
 Never logged since European 
settlement, the forest was celebrated as an example of primeval 
American nature and set aside as a preserve with much fanfare. But 
nature was not standing still; the oaks and hickories for which the 
forest was famous were being replaced by maples. It turned out that 
the oak-hickory forest historically had been maintained by fires 
periodically set by Native Americans. With the exclusion of fire, the 
European-Americans who thought they were preserving a living 
museum had ensured that it would instead become ―a forest that 
nobody had predicted,‖258 and that no one really wanted. 
Of course, the Hutchinson Forest story is entirely consistent with 
the Clementsian theory of succession—the preserve‘s managers were 
witnessing succession toward a climax community in the absence of 
disturbance. But it powerfully illustrates that nature will not 
automatically produce the preferred human outcome—a perfect 
garden of Eden—if it is simply walled off from human influence. 
What we think of as nature may be neither stable nor natural, in the 
sense of having been shaped primarily by forces other than human 
influence. The story also demonstrates that nature or what we think of 
as nature is difficult to predict: we cannot be sure that marking 
boundaries on the land and walking away will achieve our 
conservation goals, but we also may not know what affirmative 
management actions would help us reach those goals. 
In 1973, both ecological theory and practical experience supported 
the static ―hands off‖ approach, notwithstanding some chinks in the 
armor. The balance of nature theory did not long survive the ESA‘s 
passage, however. Paradigm shifts in science can come rapidly once 
they gather enough momentum. By 1992 Eugene Odum, perhaps the 
best-known advocate of the equilibrium view, had publicly recanted, 
declaring that ecosystems are ―far from equilibrium.‖259 Practice 
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changed more slowly. By the mid-1980s, though, observers and 
managers of the national parks, the highest-profile preserve system in 
the United States, were publicly worrying about the vulnerability of 
those preserves to external threats and wondering whether to let 
―natural‖ (lightning-caused) fires burn.260 In 1989, Bill McKibben 
proclaimed ―The End of Nature,‖ arguing that, in light of 
anthropogenic global climate change, there was no place on Earth 
remote enough to harbor nature unaltered by humanity.
261
 That 
observation knocked the intellectual underpinnings out from under 
the ―hands off‖ strategy but did not end either its intuitive or practical 
appeal. 
At this point, three problems with the ―hands off‖ strategy have 
become obvious. First, some parts of nature are not helped by a 
preserve-based strategy. As we have expanded our sights from the 
systems we know best, conventional terrestrial ecosystems, we have 
found more and more places where we simply cannot wall nature in 
or adverse impacts out. Technology can help, but it cannot solve the 
core problems of high permeability and interdependence. 
Improvements in mapping and monitoring, for example, have made it 
simple enough to draw lines on the water that ―ocean zoning,‖ a 
concept that a generation ago was applied only to keep foreigners out 
of ―our‖ waters, is now a highly articulated concept that is widely 
advocated and beginning to be applied.
262
 But we cannot fence fish 
into areas designated as marine reserves. Similarly, in freshwater 
systems, it is typically impractical to have flowing water in one reach 
 
(1992). 
 260. Robert B. Keiter, The Law of Fire: Reshaping Public Land Policy in an Era of 
Ecology and Litigation, 36 ENVTL. L. 301, 308–11 (2006); Paul Schullery, The Fires and Fire 
Policy, 39 BIOSCIENCE 686 (1989). Debates over fire policy came to a head in the wake of the 
1988 fires at Yellowstone National Park. For an in-depth analysis of the Yellowstone fires and 
their impact on fire policy, see ROCKY BARKER, SCORCHED EARTH: HOW THE FIRES OF 
YELLOWSTONE CHANGED AMERICA (2005). 
 261. BILL MCKIBBEN, THE END OF NATURE (1989). 
 262. See, e.g., Josh Eagle, James N. Sanchirico & Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Ocean Zoning 
and Spatial Access Privileges: Rewriting the Tragedy of the Regulated Ocean, 17 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L.J. 646 (2008); Karen Hansen, Kathryn Mengerink & Michael Sutton, A Bold New 
Ocean Agenda: Recommendations for Ocean Governance, Energy Policy, and Health, 39 
ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10012 (2009); Deborah A. Sivas & Margaret R. Caldwell, A 
New Vision for California Ocean Governance: Comprehensive Ecosystem-Based Marine 
Zoning, 27 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 209 (2008). 
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of a stream while allowing another to be ―dewatered‖ for out-of-
stream uses. 
Second, many natural systems are internally dynamic, and that 
dynamism is essential to the maintenance of their unique biota. In 
Nebraska, for example, the Platte River was historically a braided 
system of many shallow channels broken up by low sandbars. Those 
sandbars provided nesting sites for the endangered piping plover. 
Low sandbars can be maintained only by a river with highly variable 
flows that periodically scour and even relocate the sandbars. Constant 
flows which leave the sandbars undisturbed are not suitable; in the 
absence of scouring flows, vegetation growth destroys the sandbars‘ 
value as nesting habitat.
263
 Piping plovers require a dynamic system 
that is constantly both destroying and simultaneously creating habitat. 
Many other species, including fire-adapted
264
 and estuarine
265
 species, 
are now thought to depend upon variable or dynamic environments. 
Third, external effects can undermine even the largest and best-
managed preserves. McKibben‘s 1989 observation is widely accepted 
today: there is no hiding from phenomena like global warming and 
ocean acidification. Glacier National Park soon will be without 
glaciers, and Joshua trees are not regenerating in their namesake 
park.
266
 Range shifts and behavioral changes already are widely 
observed,
267
 and a significant number of climate ―niches‖ are likely to 
disappear (while other new ones appear) in the relatively near 
future.
268
 No wall can keep those effects out; even the most active 
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(1983). 
 265. JAY LUND ET AL., ENVISIONING FUTURES FOR THE SACRAMENTO-SAN JOAQUIN 
DELTA 62–78 (2007) (arguing that the key to restoring desirable species in the Delta is to 
recreate habitats featuring high variability in salinity, channel flows, depth, and water clarity). 
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management measures within the preserve are futile. As Bill Rodgers 
observed in 1994, ―global warming alone might mean that to achieve 
anything approaching ecological stability, Yellowstone National Park 
would have to travel northwards at a rate of about three kilometers 
per year.‖269 As a conservation tool, the preserve strategy may still be 
necessary, but it is no longer sufficient. 
C. Facilitating Adaptive Management 
The collapse of the equilibrium paradigm shattered our illusions 
that we could manage nature on a comprehensive rationality 
model.
270
 In a non-equilibrium world, nature is full of surprises. What 
we now know is that there is much we do not know. Learning has 
become as important as acting. When ignorance is everywhere, 
actions should be tentative, not necessarily hesitant or cautious, but 
subject to reconsideration as the knowledge base builds up.
271
 
Roughly coincident with the move away from the equilibrium 
paradigm, ecologists began to look for tools to deal with uncertainty 
and facilitate learning. Drawing on disciplines as diverse as decision 
theory, organizational behavior, and policy analysis,
272
 Carl Walters 
and C.S. (―Buzz‖) Holling offered ―adaptive management‖ as a 
structured approach to learning and adjusting management 
decisions.
273
  
Adaptive management aims to create policies that can help 
organizations, managers, and other stakeholders respond to and take 
advantage of unanticipated events. Instead of seeking precise 
predictions of future conditions, adaptive management recognizes the 
uncertainties associated with forecasting future outcomes and calls 
 
of Novel and Disappearing Climates by 2100 AD, 104 PROC. NAT‘L ACAD. SCI. 5738, 5738 
(2007). 
 269. Rodgers, Jr., supra note 211, at 890. 
 270. Id. at 887–88. 
 271. See Daniel A. Farber, Environmental Protection as a Learning Experience, 27 
LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 791, 798 (1994) ([W]hen the information base is itself subject to rapid 
change . . . [i]t makes little sense to agonize over today‘s decision when it is likely to require 
revision tomorrow anyway.‖). 
 272. NAT‘L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT FOR WATER RESOURCES 
PROJECT PLANNING 19 (2004).  
 273. CARL WALTERS, ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT OF RENEWABLE RESOURCES (1986); 
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for consideration of a range of possible future outcomes: 
―[M]anagement policies are designed to be flexible and are subject to 
adjustment in an iterative, social learning process.‖274 
Learning can happen in a variety of ways, ranging from trial and 
error to rigorously controlled experimentation. Any form of 
structured learning could be called adaptive management; the 
essential elements are an iterative or incremental set of decisions, 
monitoring to provide the opportunity for learning, and a 
commitment to revisiting or adjusting decisions in light of new 
knowledge.
275
 Many conservation policymakers are enthusiastic 
advocates of adaptive management, but it remains ―an idea often 
appealed to but rarely achieved in natural resource management.‖276 
HCP approval under the ESA is one prominent example of giving 
lip service to the concept of adaptive management while ignoring its 
substance. The Services claim to be committed to adaptive 
management, talking about its role in dealing with uncertainty, and 
requiring contingency planning for changed circumstances.
277
 But 
they have not actually used adaptive management as a tool to reduce 
uncertainty or to make course corrections. Instead, empty promises of 
adaptive management have been used as an excuse to grant permits 
on the basis of very thin information, while the ―no surprises‖ policy 
has precluded any serious reevaluation of permit terms as more 
information is gathered.
278
 
This strategy is problematic for existing HCPs, given the limited 
information base on which most are founded. It becomes more 
problematic as climate change looms. Although climate models are 
now reasonably good at predicting global-scale changes in 
temperature, they are much less good at predicting local changes in 
temperature, precipitation patterns, sea level, and the like that 
mediate species-level impacts.
279
 Even less is known about how 
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biotic interactions and adaptation might change the scenario.
280
 
Climate change thus magnifies the difficulty of predicting the future 
effectiveness of current conservation measures and greatly increases 
the need for robust adaptive management. 
IV. CAN WE GET THERE FROM HERE? 
So far, I have argued that, as a product of its time and context, the 
ESA takes an unrealistically static view of species, landscapes, and 
legal obligations, and I have endeavored to show that the disjunction 
between the Act‘s static assumptions and dynamic reality undermines 
its ability to serve its conservation goals. The next step is to ask 
whether the Act‘s assumptions can be made more realistic. 
We now have a better understanding of relevant science than was 
available at the time of the ESA‘s enactment, or at the time that initial 
implementation decisions were being made. This knowledge 
highlights the importance of escaping the static mindset. We can see 
that species are not only dynamic entities but also entities that can 
change on time scales relevant to policy choices. We know that 
protected landscapes not only are not static, they are currently facing 
change on a scale and at a rate without precedent in human 
experience. We understand that entrenching legal obligations 
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projections of expected changes.‖); NAT‘L RESEARCH COUNCIL, EVALUATING PROGRESS OF 
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OF THE EFFECTS OF GLOBAL CHANGE ON THE UNITED STATES 3 (2008), http://www.ostp.gov/ 
galleries/NSTC%20Reports/Scientific%20Assessment%20FULL%20Report.pdf (observing 
that ―attribution of the drivers of long-term temperature changes on time scales of less than 50 
years and at regional scales (e.g., county, state, or multiple states, as opposed to continental), 
with limited exceptions, has not yet been established‖). 
 280. See, e.g., Matthew C. Fitzpatrick & William W. Hargrove, The Projection of Species 
Distribution Models and the Problem of Non-Analog Climate, 18 BIODIVERSITY & 
CONSERVATION 2255 (2009); Richard G. Pearson & Terence P. Dawson, Predicting the 
Impacts of Climate Change on the Distribution of Species: Are Bioclimate Envelope Models 
Useful?, 12 GLOBAL ECOLOGY & BIOGEOGRAPHY 361 (2003). 
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provides certainty to the regulated community at the potential 
expense of protected resources. 
Recognizing that change is important does not alone make it 
happen. Law is quite deliberately resistant to change; it requires a 
high activation energy to move it from its established state to a new 
one. Legal change is always costly, so it should not be sought unless 
there is a reasonable probability that the new state will be preferable 
to the old. In this section, I examine the very real barriers to dynamic 
conservation law and look for steps that could help us move at least 
incrementally in that direction. 
A. The Barriers: Politics, Psychology, and Practicality 
One potential barrier can be set aside at the outset: there is nothing 
in the ESA that would preclude a more dynamic approach. None of 
the static interpretations here are explicitly demanded by the statute. 
Comprehensive legislative reconsideration of the ESA, which is 
sufficiently cumbersome and sufficiently risky that it has not 
happened for more than twenty years,
281
 is not needed to better match 
the law with the reality of changeable nature. 
Nonetheless, there are very real barriers to creating a more 
dynamic law. I will consider them in order of the height of the hurdle 
I believe they present to improving implementation of the law. 
The first of these barriers is politics. Any change that increases the 
law‘s demands of landowners and resource users will face stiff 
resistance, particularly if it is known in advance where those 
demands will fall most heavily. Throughout its history, ESA 
implementation has been a story of political compromise and 
accommodation of development interests, with only scattered 
sightings of an administrative spine.
282
 That is not surprising, given 
that the costs of regulation fall on a relatively small, identifiable, and 
politically sophisticated group, while the benefits are spread widely 
across society.
283
 
 
 281. The ESA was last significantly amended in 1988. Endangered Species Act 
Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-478, 102 Stat. 2306 (1988) (codified at 16 U.S.C. 
§§ 1531–1544 (2006)). 
 282. See, e.g., Doremus, supra note 182, at 57–63. 
 283. See JOSEPH L. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT 52–62 (1970) (describing 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol32/iss1/7
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2010]  Static Law Meets Dynamic World 231 
 
 
Nonetheless, I do not believe that the changes contemplated here 
are politically unfeasible. For one thing, endangered species are not 
without their own politically sophisticated allies, who are currently 
enjoying renewed influence in the legislative and executive branches 
after eight or more years of wandering in the political desert. For 
another, these changes would be made at the level of general 
regulations or policy guidance, a level at which national 
environmental groups have their best opportunity to mobilize 
effective support, rather than in individual implementing decisions 
that might fly under the national radar. If environmental interests 
were willing to push, and if the administration were not too distracted 
by its other priorities, these changes would at least be politically 
possible. 
The second barrier to adopting a more dynamic conservation law 
is human psychology. People are uncomfortable with dynamic 
natural systems and have spent considerable effort and resources in a 
quest to remove variability from those systems.
284
 ―Ever since human 
beings decided to anchor themselves to the map by cultivating fields 
they have been obsessed with stabilizing dynamic nature.‖285 Floods, 
fires, droughts, and other manifestations of nature‘s instability are 
hard on settled, territorial creatures. It is unnatural, in a very real 
sense, to expect people to embrace the notion that nature must be 
allowed to be dynamic at their expense. The psychological pull of a 
stable vision of nature makes it difficult even to confront the 
problem. People, even people who intellectually know better, 
intuitively see natural kinds as invariant and landscapes as static. The 
invisibility of nature‘s true dynamic nature undoubtedly complicates 
the political challenge. 
The psychological challenge is even greater with respect to 
overcoming the ESA‘s static vision of legal obligations. People are 
 
situations in which agency decisions were successfully manipulated by narrow special 
interests); Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice and Just Compensation, 9 CONST. COMMENT. 279, 
289 (1992) (describing that ―small groups with high stakes have a disproportionately great 
influence on the political process‖). 
 284. Holly Doremus & Michael Hanemann, The Challenges of Dynamic Water 
Management in the American West, 26 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL‘Y 55, 62 (2008); Norton, 
supra note 170, at 54–55. 
 285. Doremus & Hanemann, supra note 284, at 62. 
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just as uncomfortable with unstable regulatory systems as they are 
with dynamic nature.
286
 That is especially true when capital and 
emotional investments are at stake, as they typically are with land and 
water use regulations. People want security in their investments. 
Even when the investment is someone else‘s, people may find it easy 
to empathize with the victims of rule changes, particularly if they 
seem to have been targeted by the government for unfavorable 
treatment.
287
 For that reason, the political and psychological 
difficulties of revising the ―no surprises‖ policy are likely to be 
particularly acute. 
The third barrier to adopting a dynamic conservation strategy is 
the difficulty of finding practical alternatives to the current structure. 
Perhaps surprisingly, this may be the most difficult barrier to 
surmount. If we let go of the static view of nature, it may be difficult 
to find alternative stopping points that are concrete enough to be 
enforceable and limited enough to win political acceptance. With 
respect to the taxonomy problem, for example, as difficult as it may 
be to identify populations that merit protection, it is much more 
difficult to identify and operationalize protection of biological 
diversity, ecosystems, ecosystem processes, resilience, ecosystem 
services, or any other target.
288
 Given the need to define units of 
regulatory focus and the intuitive appeal of individual species, I do 
not believe that we can evade the taxonomy problem by protecting 
higher levels of organization. 
Practicality is also a barrier to efforts to get away from the 
paradigm of static preserves as a conservation strategy. The static 
vision allows us to use history as our conservation target and to 
 
 286. Id. at 63. 
 287. This is the kind of effect Frank Michelman had in mind when he argued that 
demoralization costs must be taken into account in any efficiency calculation of the 
consequences of an uncompensated government taking of property. See Frank I. Michelman, 
Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” 
Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1214–15 (1967). Here, I am not endorsing Michelman‘s views on 
compensation, but simply observing that there seem to be special psychological costs to the loss 
of something that has been viewed as an entitlement. 
 288. See Oliver A. Houck, On the Law of Biodiversity and Ecosystem Management, 81 
MINN. L. REV. 869, 873 (1997) (concluding that ―however high we raise our sights towards 
managing the whole, the requirements of individual species will remain the bottom line, or we 
will have no bottom line, and the entire effort will fail‖). 
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achieve that target by simply forbidding disruption of the status quo. 
Without history as a target, it will be difficult to understand or define 
what we want to protect. And without faith in the persistence of the 
status quo, it may be difficult to decide what obligations may fairly 
be imposed. Uncomfortable as these questions are, we cannot avoid 
them in a world where we know the status quo is unstable. 
B. Baby Steps toward a More Mature Law 
Even with these barriers, we can take small steps toward an 
incrementally more dynamic law. The essentialist fallacy can be 
addressed by revisions to the ESU and DPS Policies, coupled with 
new guidance for the identification of species and subspecies. The 
Services should explicitly acknowledge that evolution is a current, 
not just an historical, phenomenon. They may continue to use 
evidence from the past, such as divergence in neutral genetic 
markers, but they should also take into account the possibility of 
rapid divergence within groups with the same genetic history. This 
means looking for adaptive divergence in phenotype, behavior, 
ecology, and genes; supporting the development of new tests for 
adaptive divergence; and drawing lines between groups that are likely 
to be rapidly diverging, like hatchery and wild-spawned fish, no 
matter how recently they shared a common ancestor. Lines will still 
be difficult to draw, contested, and at some level arbitrary, but at least 
they will rest on realistic principles. 
The wilderness fallacy is likely to present the greatest challenge to 
adopting a more dynamic conservation model. It must be addressed 
with a new focus on restricting harmful actions across the landscape, 
rather than designating a small proportion of inviolate reserves. This 
will be challenging because so much of the human footprint on the 
landscape is, or at least seems to be, irreversible. It may mean 
restricting the most intensive land uses to smaller portions of the 
landscape until we learn more about what the natural world of the 
future will look like. Given the radical uncertainty that global climate 
change brings, an effective conservation strategy will certainly 
require weaning ourselves off the arrogant notion that we can strike 
the perfect balance between use and conservation of the natural world 
around us. On the other hand, that same uncertainty may paralyze 
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decision makers, leaving them grasping at the ―hands off‖ strategy as 
the most humble approach to a world that is neither static nor 
predictable.
289
 In order to avoid that paralysis, we must strive to 
improve our forecasting tools as rapidly as possible, so that managers 
have a better idea of viable targets for the lands under their 
stewardship and the regulated community has a better idea of what 
might be expected of them in the future. 
With respect to the rule of law fallacy, we must acknowledge 
uncertainty and focus on learning and retaining flexibility to respond 
to new information. An easy step in that direction would be to tie the 
extent of ―no surprises‖ protection explicitly to our level of 
knowledge about the system. The more we know, the more confident 
we are of our predictions for the future, the more willing we should 
be to offer strong regulatory certainty to a permittee. The less we 
know at the outset, the more we should require a permit applicant to 
accept the possibility of increased future obligations. 
CONCLUSION 
The drafting and implementation of the ESA reflect the context of 
the times, including the prevailing scientific beliefs, the political 
context, and common background assumptions. Such beliefs, 
contexts, and assumptions pushed it toward three fallacies based in a 
static conception of nature and of law: the essentialist fallacy, the 
wilderness fallacy, and the rule of law fallacy. At the time, those 
ideas approximated reality closely enough to work reasonably well, 
but that no longer is the case. We now know that nature is capable of 
rapid change, and we expect such change to be the rule rather than 
the exception in the twenty-first century. For the ESA to effectively 
serve our conservation goals, it must adopt a more realistic view that 
accounts for nature‘s dynamic qualities and avoids freezing legal 
obligations. These changes will not be easy to achieve, because 
dynamic regulatory regimes are politically, psychologically, and 
practically difficult to implement. There are, however, some 
 
 289. M. Martin Smith & Fiona Gow, Unnatural Preservation, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Feb. 
1, 2008, at 12. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol32/iss1/7
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2010]  Static Law Meets Dynamic World 235 
 
 
relatively straightforward steps that could move the ESA 
incrementally toward the dynamic law it will have to be in the future. 
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